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The Case for "Trial by Formula"
Alexandra D. Lahav*
The civil justice system tolerates inconsistent outcomes in cases brought by
similarly situated litigants. One reason for this is that in cases such as Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized lib-
erty over equality. Litigants' right to a "day in court" has overshadowed their
right to equal treatment. However, an emerging jurisprudence at the district
court level is asserting the importance of what this Article calls "outcome
equality "-similar results reached in similar cases. Taking the example of mass
tort litigation, this Article explains how innovative procedures such as sampling
are a solution to the problem of inconsistent outcomes. Outcome equality,
achieved through statistical adjudication, is gaining force on the ground
Despite the Supreme Court's principled stance in favor of liberty in a series of
recent opinions, a victory for outcome equality is good for our civil justice
system.
To date, the discussion about civil-litigation reform has focused on the
conflict between the individual's right to participation and society's interest in
the efficient disposition of the great volume of outstanding litigation. This con-
flict is real and is particularly troublesome in mass torts, where tens of
thousands of plaintiffs file related cases, making it impossible for the courts to
hold a hearing for each claimant. But the fixation on this conflict ignores the
fact that an individual's right to equal treatment is also a critical value and can
conflict with the individual's right to participation. This Article reframes the
debate about procedural justice in the mass tort context as a conflict between
liberty and equality rather than liberty and efficiency. The rights at stake are
not only the individual's right to a day in court to pursue his claim as he wishes,
but also the right to be treated as others in similar circumstances are treated.
This Article defends district court attempts to achieve equality among litigants
by adopting statistical methods and advocates greater rigor in the use of these
methods so that courts can more effectively promote outcome equality.
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks to Lucian Bebchuk, Jack
Beerman, Bob Bone, Beth Burch, Robin Effron, Kent Greenawalt, Kaaryn Gustafson, Sam
Issacharoff, Jay Kadane, Ruth Mason, Henry Monaghan, the late Richard Nagareda, Jeremy Paul,
John Pfaff, Judith Resnik, and Peter Siegelman for helpful comments and to participants at
workshops at UConn, Columbia, Florida State University, and Brooklyn Law Schools.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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Introduction
That like cases ought to be treated alike is a basic common law
principle. Judges recognize that consistency in case outcomes is a
characteristic of the rule of law.2 Yet our civil justice system tolerates a great
2. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-26 (2008) (lamenting
unpredictability in punitive damages awards); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139
(2005) ("Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote
the basic principle ofjustice that like cases should be decided alike."). Scholars have also noted this
principle but have rarely analyzed it. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative
Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 147 (1990) (describing random
outcomes in tort cases as "a flaw in the system that undermines the system's accuracy and
fairness"); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAs L. REV. 1, 39 (1994) ("[N]ational uniformity of federal law
ensures that similarly situated litigants are treated equally; this is considered a hallmark of fairness
in a regime committed to the rule of law."); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 858
(1984) ("Procedural systems are supposed to treat like cases alike; consistency is the systematic
analogue to the impartiality feature demanded of individual decisionmakers."); William B.
Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1866-67 &
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deal of inconsistency in outcomes. Study after study has shown that both
jurors and legal professionals assess damages inconsistently in tort cases.
The procedural law reinforces this inconsistency. Juries deliberate without
knowing what other juries have done in similar cases.4 In the federal courts,
judges may overturn jury verdicts only if the judge finds that no reasonable
juror could have reached the verdict and may remit an award only if it is so
large that it "shock[s] the conscience."5  Litigants may settle cases without
ascertaining what similar litigants received in settlement.
This is a curious disconnect. Why would a system committed to the
rule of law so cavalierly permit similar cases to come out differently
from one another? The procedural law's failure to enforce consistency in
outcomes--even as judges laud the well-worn common law principle that
like cases ought to be treated alike-reflects a deep tension in civil litigation
between liberty and equality. Liberty in civil litigation is summed up as the
"deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court."6  Equality is embodied in the common law principle that like cases
ought to be treated alike.
Liberty and equality are not inherently at odds with one another.8 In our
system of decentralized decision makers, however, a tension between liberty
n.8 (2002) (describing how most scholars assert equality as a value in civil procedure without
explaining it).
3. See infra subparts l(B)-(C) (discussing unexplained variation in jury verdicts and in the
evaluation of damages by potential jurors and legal professionals).
4. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 773, 781-83 (1995)
(describing and analyzing lack of information in jury instructions). See generally Roselle L.
Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and
Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 714, 716, 723-24 (2000) (collecting and analyzing
jury instructions).
5. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 160-62 (2d ed. 1995); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (announcing the
standard for granting a new trial or altering a judgment). In some state courts, the standard is lower.
In New York, for example, the standard is whether the verdict "deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
6. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417
(1st ed. 1981)); Richard v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (same); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (same), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77; accord Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (citing
Richard, 517 U.S. at 798). The fact that the Court transitioned from citing Wright & Miller in
Ortiz, Martin, and Richard to citing Richard in Taylor indicates that the Court has internalized the
day in court ideal as part of its own jurisprudence, as opposed to an outsider's description.
7. The principle of equality has other expressions in civil procedure, such as equality of access
to the courts and equality of resources in litigation. See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 1867-68
(summarizing several equality concerns addressed by civil procedure, including "equality in the
litigants' capacities to produce their proofs and arguments" and "achiev[ing] consistent outcomes in
like cases"). This Article is exclusively concerned with equality of outcomes between similarly
situated persons.
8. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2011)
(noting the widespread understanding that "equality and liberty claims are often intertwined").
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and equality is inevitable. In the procedural law-by which I mean federal
constitutional law, common law doctrines, and interpretations of the formal
procedural rules of our civil justice system-liberty has been the clear victor
in the doctrinal contest between the two values at the appellate level.9
Nevertheless, equality is winning many battles on the ground.
The Supreme Court has consistently favored the liberty of individual
adjudication over equality. For example, in his opinion in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes last term, Justice Scalia disparaged the idea of "Trial by
Formula" because it does not provide individualized adjudication. 0  In
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion," the majority assumed that the baseline
of adjudication is individualized suits,12 leading Justice Breyer to ask,
"Where does the majority get its contrary idea-that individual, rather than
class, arbitration is a 'fundamental attribut[e]' of arbitration?" 3  Similarly,
the Court has limited the availability of class actions to resolve mass tort
cases in the interest of protecting individual litigants, especially persons
whose injuries have not yet manifested.14 In Taylor v. Sturgell,'5 the Court
held that individuals cannot be precluded from bringing their own suits even
if those suits are completely duplicative and brought by parties who are
Sometimes the "day in court" ideal can serve equality, as when the Supreme Court reversed
certification of a mass tort settlement class on the grounds of adequacy of representation when the
future claimants were treated inequitably. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626
(1997) (describing "[t]he disparity between the currently injured and exposure-only categories of
plaintiffs").
9. The latest victory for the liberty principle is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2559 (2011), in which the Court expressed concern about individuals being precluded from pressing
compensatory damages claims in the aftermath of a class action seeking only injunctive relief and
back pay. As Judith Resnik points out, the recent cases discussed here limit litigant access to justice
using the language of individual rights. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REV. 78, 80 (2011)
("[Tihe constitutional concept of courts as a basic public service provided by government is under
siege.").
10. Id at 2561 ("We disapprove [of] that novel project.").
11. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
12. Id at 1750 (describing the "often-dominant procedural aspects of certification," such as the
protection of absent parties).
13. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
14. Three cases are widely understood to have ended the possibility of certifying a mass tort
class action. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821-22, 864 (1999) (overturning use of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) to certify a mandatory limited-fund class action arising
out of injuries caused by exposure to asbestos); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
597, 619-20 (1997) (overturning class settlement of large numbers of asbestos claims in part on
grounds of inadequate representation); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir.
2001) (permitting collateral attack on class settlement of Agent Orange litigation on grounds of
inadequate representation), aff'd per curiam in part by an equally divided court, vacated in part,
539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008
SUP. CT. REV. 183, 208 ("[C]lass actions seemed to drop out of the available set of tools for
attempting to settle most mass torts, absent some extraordinary willingness of a settling defendant to
allow some form of future claims to return to the tort system." (footnote omitted)).
15. 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008).
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virtually identical.16 And in Martin v. Wilks,17 the Court held that individuals
who failed to intervene in an earlier employment discrimination suit in which
consent decrees were entered could challenge employment decisions made
pursuant to those decrees.' 8 Each of these decisions stressed the importance
of individualized adjudication.
Although liberty dominates the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, an
equality principle is emerging at the district court level. Because the
Supreme Court's case law has limited litigants' ability to use the class action
device to resolve mass torts on an aggregate basis as a formal matter, district
courts are using informal procedures to facilitate settlements of mass tort
cases. These innovative procedures include informational bellwether trials, a
distant cousin of statistical sampling or Trial by Formula. For example, the
judge in In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation (WTC Disaster
Site Litigation) scheduled a series of sample trials to promote settlement.' 9
Had these trials gone forward, the results would have been used by the par-
ties and the judge to inform the contours of a settlement. When the parties
ultimately settled, the judge reviewed the settlement to ascertain that all the
litigants were treated fairly.20 The judge used his discretion to achieve infor-
mally the equality-promoting processes the Supreme Court has limited so
severely in its emphasis on liberty.
Long a topic of significant scholarship, mass torts have received more
attention recently because of attempts to resolve high-profile cases using sta-
tistical techniques. 2 1 The problem in mass tort litigation is that so many
cases are brought that it is impossible to adjudicate them in a traditional way.
16. Id. at 2178.
17. 490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77.
18. Id. at 761-63.
19. Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, at 1-3, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster
Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21MC1OO Ord Amend CMO8 FEB19 2009 1118.pdf.
20. See Fairness Order-Decedent's Estates at 2, In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig.,
No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) & In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site & Lower Manhattan Disaster Site
Litig., No. 21 MC 103 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/
show.php?db=91 l&id=641 (noting that an earlier proposed settlement had been rejected by the
court). A revised settlement was approved by the judge and resolved the litigation. Id. Between
the filing of the initial proposed settlement and the ultimate approval, the defendants filed for a writ
of mandamus from the judge's order rejecting the first settlement. Order Regulating Proceedings at
1-2, In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), In re World Trade Ctr.
Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 102 (AKH) & In re Combined World Trade Ctr.
& Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 103 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010),
available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db-91 1&id=534.
21. E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 277-80 (2011) (describing the Vioxx settlement); Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age ofAggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 153-56 (2009) (criticizing
certification of the class in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and the role that statistical analysis
played in that certification); Symposium, Aggregate Litigation: Critical Perspectives, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 293 (2011) (considering current issues in group litigation).
2012] 575
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For this reason, the debate has focused on whether resolving these cases
using more efficient procedures, such as sample trials, merits abrogating
individuals' rights to control their own litigation. Most scholars have framed
this debate as expressing a tension between individual liberty and aggregate
social welfare. David Rosenberg has argued in favor of mandatory class
actions to "secur[e] optimal deterrence and insurance through mass tort
liability" and thereby promote both individual and collective welfare.2 2
Similarly, Michael Saks and Peter Blanck advocated adjudication through
sampling as a more precise and reliable method of resolving mass tort
cases. 23 Laurens Walker and John Monahan have made cogent arguments
that sampling is both efficient and accurate. 24 Others have focused on liti-
gant participation as a counterweight to aggregate social welfare arguments.
For example, Robert Bone has offered a normative evaluation of arguments
for sampling in light of the right to participation.25 But few have addressed
the issue of outcome equality in any significant way.26
22. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 832 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action]. Rosenberg has written a series of influential articles advocating class treatment for mass
torts. E.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg,
Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 210 (1996); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs
Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (2000); David Rosenberg, OfEnd Games and Openings in Mass
Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989). As noted earlier, this
proposal runs against the tide of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area. See Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (rejecting a mandatory mass tort class action).
23. Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 851 (1992) (arguing
that aggregation of cases "systematically increase[s] accuracy" and "reduce[s] bias"); accord
Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L.
REV. 1013, 1066 (2007) (arguing for the use of multiple verdicts to informally resolve mass tort
cases).
24. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 567 (1998)
(noting the availability of highly efficient survey techniques); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 969, 988 (2007) (noting that random
sampling may provide "a more accurate picture of the facts at issue than the study of each case one-
by-one").
25. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 619-21 (1993); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 259-73 (2004) (articulating a theory of procedural justice grounded in a
right to participation).
26. Sometimes scholars briefly mention outcome equality without discussion. See, e.g., Saks &
Blanck, supra note 23, at 831 (briefly noting that aggregation sometimes facilitates outcome
equality and then moving on to a discussion of other issues). There are a few exceptions. See
Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 147 & n.30 (1990) (explaining that any objection to the "randomness" of
outcomes in the tort system based on fairness is grounded in "the venerable principle of treating like
claims equally"); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1481, 1513-14 (1992) (concluding that aggregation may contribute to outcome equality by
making it more likely that similar cases will be adjudicated by similar standards); Rubenstein, supra
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This Article reframes the debate by reconceptualizing the core tension
in civil litigation generally, and mass torts in particular, as one between lib-
erty and equality. It demonstrates that district court judges are pursuing
procedures that promote litigant equality and that this presents a procedural
counterweight to the individualistic emphasis of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. In mass torts, similar cases arising out of the same conduct
are brought by the tens of thousands and consolidated before one judge.
These judges are using sample trials and other innovative procedures to
equalize outcomes among these litigants. Until recently, the procedural law
has favored liberty because equality is difficult or perhaps impossible to
achieve in a system of decentralized decision makers. But where adjudica-
tion is centralized, as in mass torts, the possibility of promoting outcome
equality surfaces. This Article explains how equality-in the form of con-
sistent outcomes-is gaining traction and why-despite the Supreme Court's
consistent preference for liberty-a victory for equality in this context is
good for our civil litigation system.
In order to understand how outcome equality is emerging as a valuable
principle on the ground through informal sampling and evaluate whether this
is good for our civil justice system, it is first necessary to understand how
outcomes are reached in "ordinary" civil litigation. Part I of this Article
explains how injuries are ordinarily valued, focusing on tort cases. This part
explains why the application of this legal framework can result in incon-
sistent damages awards in similar cases. This part then considers how other
facets of the political economy of individualized civil litigation, particularly
settlement, are limited in their capacity to achieve outcome equality between
similarly situated litigants. Finally, Part I contrasts the inequalities present in
ordinary tort litigation with the equality-promoting procedures available in
mass tort litigation.
Part II sets forth the arguments in favor of outcome equality and
considers the doctrinal support for this principle. This part begins by
considering whether equality is an independent principle that makes sense to
invoke at all. Some scholars have argued that equality is derivative of the
substantive requirements of the law and the duty to apply the law
accurately.2 7 I argue that equality is an independent and useful principle to
note 2, at 1893-97 (discussing how the design of civil procedure doctrines contributes to outcome
equity). These are the only articles I know of that discuss equality in the context of variability in the
outcomes in mass tort cases. They do not conceptualize the problem as a manifestation of the
tension between equality and liberty. Similarly, proposals to increase consistency in tort verdicts
(outside the mass tort context) do not address this tension. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 832-
40 (discussing various methods of achieving horizontal equity among jury verdicts but failing to
mention the tension between liberty and equality); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for
Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 318-19 (1989) (pondering the use of the
jury as a survey mechanism to evaluate the price of nonpecuniary losses in tort cases).
27. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982)
("[T]he idea of equality is logically indistinguishable from the standard formula of distributive
justice. . . .").
2012]1 577
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consider. But establishing the importance of outcome equality is an
important first step. The correct application of the law does not do the work
of an equality principle because the law is ambiguous and can permit a wide
range of outcomes. Simply applying the law "correctly" does not lead to
outcome equality. Equality ought to be understood as a comparative right
that requires judges to give legally valid reasons for treating similarly situ-
ated persons differently. The justification should demonstrate that litigants
who are being treated differently are in fact different in legally relevant ways,
and therefore differential treatment does not violate their right to equal treat-
ment under the law. Once a principle of equality is established, it is still
necessary to determine which differences among litigants merit differential
treatment. Outcome equality also requires consideration of the timing of
litigation, which has a substantial effect on outcomes but is often ignored by
scholars.
The doctrinal support for outcome equality as a legal right is very
limited. Part II analyzes subconstitutional common law and rule-based
procedural doctrines that promote outcome equality, including remittitur,
preclusion, and collective litigation. It also analyzes constitutional doctrine,
considering the extent to which the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment require outcome equality in litigation. Although judicial inter-
pretations of the United States Constitution and the procedural laws do not
prioritize outcome equality, gestures towards a principle of outcome equality
are visible in the existing doctrine.
Part III considers what judges have already done to promote outcome
equality in mass torts and analyzes what could be done better. Lower courts
are using informal sampling to achieve outcome equality, as illustrated by the
high-profile WTC Disaster Site Litigation. Sampling and similar innovative
procedures promote outcome equality by extrapolating the results of sample
trials to the rest of the plaintiff population, by adjusting the timing and the
order that cases are heard by the court, and by increasing transparency. Each
of these goals is achieved better in collective litigation than in individual
litigation. Yet there are flaws in the procedures courts currently use to
promote outcome equality. This Article responds to the most serious chal-
lenges that judges face in implementing a sampling process: (1) the problem
of adverse selection, (2) the risk of sample bias, (3) the significance of
uncertainty, especially in the form of unexplained variability in trial
outcomes, and (4) cost. Judges should implement a more rigorous method of
sampling to improve the capacity of the courts to treat like cases alike and to
justify differential treatment where it is warranted.
The conclusion sets the district courts' procedural innovations aimed at
achieving outcome equality in the context of other procedural revolutions,
most notably in pleadings doctrine, which also began with the lower courts
and percolated upward. There is reason to think that if equality wins the war
on the ground, the appellate courts may recognize that they have tilted the
578 [Vol. 90:571
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balance too far in favor of liberty. This is more likely to happen if the higher
courts recognize that what is at stake in these innovative procedures is not
only cost savings or the greatest good for the greatest number, but the right to
equal treatment that is the foundation of the rule of law.
I. The Problem: Inconsistency in Injury Valuation
Our civil justice system claims to value equality of outcomes, as
evidenced by the persistence of the maxim that like cases ought to be treated
alike. But the reality is that the system tolerates a great deal of inexplicable
variety in outcomes. The result is inequality between similarly situated
litigants.
The methods participants in the tort system use to monetize injuries
present three key problems. First, there is no agreed-upon metric for
measuring or monetizing injury in tort cases. Second, the tort system is a
complex, private, and largely hidden system of compensation.28 We do not
know enough about outcomes in tort cases. The dearth of empirical evidence
about how cases settle is symptomatic of this problem. The best datasets of
case outcomes are likely those owned by insurance companies, the entities
that pay for a lot of litigation and settlements. Insurance companies do not
ordinarily make this data available. 29 To the extent that insurance companies
are willing to sell their data to researchers, this would be a fantastic resource.
The legal system needs good qualitative empirical studies of case valuation
outside the context of juries. The third problem with the way injuries are
monetized in the current system is a result of the interaction of the first two
problems. The basis for assigning damages is comparison to other cases with
which the decision maker is familiar. This process depends on the dataset
used by the adjudicator. Comparison may entrench existing inequalities or
errors by comparing the new case to past cases. If some types of cases have
been undervalued in the past for illegal reasons, such as the race of the
plaintiff, then using those outcomes as a benchmark for current or future
28. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383, 413-15 (2007) (describing the private creation of a quasi-
administrative agency as a result of the Diet Drugs settlement as a particularly complex model for
resolving a mass tort and detailing the numerous challenges and subsequent amendments required to
determine a proper settlement); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering: How the
Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 521, 555-57
(2006) (explaining that some settlements, some predispute contracts, and some claimant-payment
systems created by mass tort settlements impose confidentiality requirements); John Fabian Witt,
Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the
Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 261 (2007) (describing tort law as having created a "far-
flung, decentralized, and often virtually invisible private bureaucracy").
29. Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion 4 (Univ. of




cases will perpetuate that undervaluation.30 Monetizing injuries based on
past outcomes also produces a static value. But if the value of cases is
dynamic and evolving, then the previous valuations may not reflect the
current consensus on the appropriate pricing of a given case.
This part lays the foundation for understanding the problem of outcome
inequality in litigation. The first subpart describes the legal framework for
monetizing injury in tort law. The second subpart describes the latest
research on variation in jury awards. The third subpart explores similar
variation among legal professionals' assessment of damages in tort cases.
The final subpart looks at damages awarded by mass tort claims-
administration facilities as a counterpoint to jury and lawyer assessments of
damages in individual cases.
A. The Legal Framework
The normative ideal of litigation outcomes is that a plaintiff ought to
receive what she is entitled to under the substantive law. For example, if the
defendant is not liable, then the plaintiff is entitled to nothing under the
substantive law. If the defendant is liable, then the plaintiff is entitled to
some measure of damages. Tort damages are usually understood to consist
of three components: (1) economic or pecuniary damages; (2) noneconomic
damages such as compensation for pain and suffering, disfigurement, emo-
tional distress, and loss of quality of life; and (3) punitive or exemplary
damages.31  The result of litigation is supposed to approximate the actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's misconduct.
Settlement is supposed to approximate the outcome that litigation would
reach. Accordingly, in settlement, the plaintiff ought to receive the appropri-
ate amount of damages under each of the three categories discounted by the
possibility that the defendant will be found not liable in the course of
litigation.32
The problem with this understanding of injury valuation is that the tort
system does not approximate the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff.
The tort system is an institution that is supposed to monetize injuries, yet
injuries are not readily monetizable. What the tort system does is assign a
30. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 158-60 (2010) (describing the use of gender- and race-based
economic data in the calculation of lost income in tort cases and noting that the use of such data can
systematically undervalue tort damages).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) (describing "three types of
damages"); id. §§ 903-909 (describing pecuniary compensatory damages, nonpecuniary
compensatory damages, and punitive damages).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 71-76
(2003) (constructing an economic model of settlement and noting that plaintiffs should accept any
settlement offer that exceeds the plaintiffs expected value of going to trial). Surprisingly, most
scholars analyzing the economics of litigation do not define "accuracy" of valuation explicitly. See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 307, 307-11 (1994) (discussing the value of accuracy to law but failing to define accuracy).
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value to the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The amount of money dam-
ages the system assigns to injuries is contextual and cultural. This means
that tort values are comparative; the value assigned to a given injury is
dependent on values assigned to other injuries. The cultural contingency of
tort damages is the reason that the amounts awarded in tort cases are some-
times controversial. This is also the reason that critics of the tort system are
able to say that the system is unpredictable.3 3 The problem of valuing injury
is not limited to the trial context. In settlement, even if one is able to accu-
rately discount the amount of damages by the probability of the defendant
being found liable, the damages assigned to a plaintiff-the amount that is to
be discounted-will still be contested.
Some scholars have proposed administrative methods for resolving the
problem of valuing injury.34 For example, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein
note that administrative agencies value loss of life based on what people
would be willing to be paid to accept risk.35 Such valuations are also
contested,36 and the authors admit that the act of pricing human life is
contextual.37
The assertion that injuries are difficult to monetize could be understood
in two ways. First, it could be read to say that it is impossible to know what
an injury is actually worth, even from a God's eye point of view. Second, it
could be interpreted as an epistemic problem: we lack the tools to accurately
monetize injuries. For the purposes of this Article, it does not matter which
of these explanations is right. We do not have the tools to accurately
monetize damages either because the task is impossible or because it is
beyond our current capabilities.
Despite the limitations of its tool kit, the tort system nevertheless needs
to monetize injuries in order to compensate plaintiffs. To do this, the law
provides a set of guidelines to juries, who hear evidence regarding the
33. See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 149, 171-74 (2004) (describing the media's role in shaping common
legal knowledge and noting that the media can reflect the rhetorical excesses of the litigation
system); Sandra F. Gavin, Stealth Tort Reform, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 444-47 (2008) (citing the
various criticisms of the tort system based on inequality of outcomes such as "litigation lottery" and
runaway juries," and citing studies demonstrating that these accusations are inaccurate).
34. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537,
587 (2005) (proposing that hedonic losses could be based upon the values given by administrative
agencies); see also Geistfeld, supra note 4, at 819 (advancing a similar proposal that determines the
optimal value of compensation based on people's willingness to accept risk but does not incorporate
the values used by administrative agencies).
35. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 34, at 551.
36. For example, Douglas Kysar has made a trenchant and convincing criticism of this
approach. See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 111-13 (2010) (arguing that these valuations rest upon the
questionable assumptions that laborers possess adequate risk awareness and free mobility, that
valuations of risk are scalable, and that all societal strata have the same preferences for risk).
37. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 34, at 554 n.64 (noting that people would be willing to
pay different amounts to avoid different kinds of statistically identical risks).
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plaintiffs damages and assign a monetary value to them. A closer look at
the law of damages in torts demonstrates how it is that tort damages are var-
ied and contextual rather than fixed and objective.
Of the three kinds of tort damages-economic, noneconomic (pain and
suffering), and punitive damages--economic damages are generally consid-
ered the most objectively ascertainable, so they are the best doctrinal area to
explore. Economic damages concern things we are accustomed to
measuring, such as wages. Although noneconomic and punitive damages are
most often criticized for being outrageous, excessive, or emotionally
driven, economic damages suffer from many of the same difficulties of
valuation. Depending on the case, economic damages may include lost
wages (past and future), medical expenses (past and future), and other finan-
cial costs. 39 Measuring economic damages is not easy or obvious and the
measure of economic damages is perhaps as contested as other forms of tort
damages.
First, predicting future lost income-a substantial part of any economic
damages award-requires the exercise of a great deal of judgment and leaves
plenty of room for argument: "It is very difficult to make an accurate
prediction, especially about the future."4 0 Consider the intuitive example of
predicting the future lost income of a law student in May 2007 as compared
to the same law student in May 2009 after the meltdown of the financial
markets in 2008 and the effects of the Great Recession on the legal job
market. Empirical evidence supports this intuition. A study of the 9/11
Victim Compensation Fund demonstrated that economic-loss awards were
influenced by testimony from forensic economists and that economic awards
varied across similarly situated claimants. 4 1 There is a range of acceptable
awards that is justifiable, rather than a specific amount that reflects an
individual's entitlement. Moreover, that range can shift over time.42
Second, economic damages are an evolving category that courts have
stretched to include damages that once were considered noneconomic. In
38. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-26 (2008) (describing criticisms
and expressing concern over "unpredictability of punitive awards"); Neil Vidmar, Pap and
Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System,
28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224-31 (1994) (describing and arguing against criticisms of
noneconomic damages).
39. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps,
80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391, 398-99 (2005) ("[D]isputes arise over how to compensate for future losses
(how to predict future earnings, working life expectancy, etc.) and jurisdictions differ over how to
calculate economic damages (present discounted value, taxation of tort recoveries, medical and
general inflation) .... .").
40. See Henry T. Greely, Trusted Systems and Medical Records: Lowering Expectations, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1585, 1591 n.9 (2000) (discussing the unknown origins of this quotation, often
attributed to Yogi Berra or Niels Bohr).
41. Frank D. Tinari et al., Did the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Accurately Assess Economic
Losses?, 6 ToPics ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, no. 1, art. 2, 2006, at 2-3, available at http://
www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1438&context-bejeap.
42. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
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wrongful death cases, for example, recovery was historically limited by stat-
ute to pecuniary damages such as lost wages, which are often quite low. 4 3
Recovery for grief and loss was not permitted. To ameliorate the harshness
of the law, judges permitted plaintiffs to demonstrate the value of services
the decedent provided, even if these were not compensated and did not have
a market value.44 These types of additional damages included both loss of
services and loss of consortium.4 5 In this way, survivors were permitted to
collect damages for the loss of wives who were uncompensated for work in
the home and children who did not work at all.46
Third, the lines between the three different categories of tort damages
are fluid. Award amounts can often be reasonably assigned to more than one
legal category, rendering the measure of damages malleable. For example,
an empirical study by Catherine Sharkey demonstrated that when noneco-
nomic damages are capped by statute, there is "little to no effect" on
compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases.47 She showed that
lawyers can use expert testimony and innovative theories to expand
categories of damages such as future wages and the costs of future medical
care. 4 8  Thus, economic losses replace other forms of damages, with the
overall total held roughly constant.
In sum, valuing injuries in tort cases is a cultural and contextualized
exercise that results in the assignment of a socially acceptable monetary
value to an injury. The doctrine governing damages is sufficiently malleable
to allow this flexibility. This is why it makes sense to speak of accuracy of a
tort award as an assignment of value, not as an approximation of actual
value.
B. Juror Valuations ofInjuries
Sociological studies of juries show that jurors understand damages
categories as fluid and malleable, supporting Sharkey's thesis. For example,
jurors interviewed by sociologist Neil Vidmar about their participation in a
medical malpractice case considered the effects of emotional trauma and
43. See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death
Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 735 (2000) (discussing the New York wrongful death statute of 1847,
which limited recovery to pecuniary damages).
44. Id. at 741-46; see also VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 138-68 (1985) (discussing the monetization of
housework and children's future income in wrongful-death cases).
45. Witt, supra note 43, at 723-24, 743-46.
46. Id. at 745.
47. Sharkey, supra note 39, at 445.
48. See id. at 438-40 (remarking that "experts can exploit controversies surrounding




disfigurement on a plaintiffs likelihood of obtaining a promotion.4 9
Damages for disfigurement should ordinarily be considered as part of the
category of noneconomic or pain and suffering damages, whereas loss of fu-
ture income ought to be considered economic damages.5o Jury treatment of
disfigurement demonstrates how porous these categories can be.
The idea that categories of damages are fluid and malleable is consistent
with the premise that many participants in the legal system think of damages
as a single, all-inclusive number as opposed to discrete legal categories.
Studies based on interviews with jurors have shown that jurors consider
damages holistically, despite the law's mandate to parse damages into the
three familiar types.
Accordingly, jurors exercise substantial leeway in determining
damages, which in turn permits variation in outcomes of similar cases.
Studies confirm that there is some variability in jury awards, but they are not
conclusive with respect to the extent of or the reasons for this variability. To
understand the truth about variability of jury verdicts, a brief discussion of
the state of empirical research is necessary.
Jury studies use two methods. One method for studying jury verdicts is
to compare verdicts in past cases.52 This is sometimes referred to as using
archival jury awards. Researchers might also interview judges or jurors
who participated in actual cases about their experience. Another method for
studying variability in jury verdicts is the simulation.54 A simulation can
consist of conversations with potential jurors or judges about a hypothetical
case or can simulate the trial environment by having groups of juries view a
mock trial or a video of a trial and deliberate.5 5 The benefit of simulation-
based studies is that they allow researchers to control the information that the
49. Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis
in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 9, 28
(2002).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905-906 (1979).
51. See Vidmar & Brown, supra note 49, at 28 (noting that the simple labeling of damages as
general or special fails to account for the "complex human judgments" that judges, lawyers, and
juries make in evaluating and assigning damages).
52. Studies using historical data like this include VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 100-04 (1986) and HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33 & n.1
(1966).
53. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 474 (2005) (explaining the advantages of
using archival studies of jury decisions).
54. Studies based on simulations include Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About
Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 301, 303 (1998) and Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 246 (1997).
55. See Diamond et al., supra note 54, at 303 (describing how the simulated juries were shown
a videotape of a simulated jury trial and then asked to come up with an award); Saks et al., supra
note 54, at 248-49 (explaining that the simulated juries read a description of the plaintiff's injuries
and a list ofjury instructions).
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"jurors" receive and compare outcomes reached by different adjudicators in
response to identical fact patterns. 56 By contrast, research based on archival
verdicts must make the argument that the cases they are comparing are in fact
similar. It is easier, therefore, to measure the variability in jury decisions in a
simulation study. Studies using simulation methodology are also flawed,
however. Simulation studies may not include all the information a jury
would have in a real case.5 And simulations may not provide the decision-
making environment that is ordinarily present in a trial. For example, a sim-
ulation that asks individual potential jurors how they would decide a
hypothetical case might yield different results than a study that allows twelve
potential jurors to deliberate before rendering a decision.
In one famous early study led by Harry Kalven, researchers interviewed
600 judges regarding 8,000 civil and criminal cases.59  With respect to the
civil cases, when the researchers compared the outcomes of actual jury ver-
dicts and hypothetical judicial "verdicts," they found that 79% of the time,
judges and juries agreed on liability.60 When judges and juries disagreed, the
different adjudicators favored plaintiffs in the same proportion; that is, the
study found no pro-plaintiff bias on the part of juries.6 A 1992 study of fed-
eral and state judges in Georgia similarly found that the judges interviewed
mostly approved of jury determinations of which party should prevail.62
The researchers found much sharper divisions on the amount of
damages. In the universe of cases where both adjudicators found for the
plaintiff, they only agreed on the amount of damages to award 9% of the
time.63 In approximately 52% of those cases where judge and jury agreed on
56. See Saks et al., supra note 54, at 246 (describing how three different levels of injury
severity were given to simulated juries, along with guidance variables including "the average award,
the award interval, the average award plus the award interval, and example awards").
57. Neil Vidmar has provided a trenchant critique of one simulation study. See Neil Vidmar,
Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et
al. 's Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359, 1383-88 (2004) (critiquing the methodology used in
CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURORS DECIDE (2002), for biasing simulation
with the presentation of one-sided evidence).
58. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 513, 554-57 (1992)
(conducting a study demonstrating an increase in jury awards after deliberation); David Schkade et
al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1140-41 (2000)
(same).
59. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1964).
60. Id. at 1065.
61. Id.
62. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26
GA. L. REV. 85, 102-07, 115 (1991) ("The Georgia trial judges' articulated perception is that they
often agree with jury decisions on which party should prevail in negligence cases."); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the (Federal) Bench, 27 GA. L. REV.
59, 74-78 (1992) ("All 16 responding federal trial judges attested that in at least 79% of all
negligence cases, they agreed with the jury's determination of the prevailing party.").
63. Kalven, supra note 59, at 1065. In the Kalven study, the judge and jury both decided for
the plaintiff in 44% of the cases. Id In 4% they were roughly in agreement, in 17% the judge
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liability, the jury favored a higher award. 4 And in approximately 39% of
cases, judges favored a higher award. Jury awards averaged 20% higher
than judicial awards.66 Subsequent studies show loose agreement between
judges and juries as to the appropriateness of jury verdicts and awards most
of the time. A 1987 National Law Journal survey of a sample of 348 state
and 57 federal judges found evidence of agreement between judges and
juries.67 Two-thirds of the judges said that jury awards are excessive in only
a few or in "virtually no" cases.
Simulation studies seem to confirm that there is unexplained variability
in damages determinations. 6 9 But the findings are by no means definitive.
To some extent, the nature of the simulation affects the results. Simulations
that permit potential jurors to deliberate, for example, may yield different
outcomes than those that ask individual jurors to make evaluations. A 1992
simulation study conducted by Shari Seidman Diamond and Jonathan Casper
found that deliberation increased jury verdicts. 70 The researchers showed a
videotaped mock trial of an antitrust price-fixing case to 1,022 potential ju-
rors in Cook County, Illinois. 71 "On average," the researchers wrote, "the
juries produced awards about $56,000 (or 26%) higher than the average of
their members prior to deliberation." 7 2  More recent simulation studies of
jury deliberations using potential jurors evaluating mock personal injury
cases have found similar increases in awards that the authors attribute to the
process of deliberation.7 3
Empirical studies of archival jury verdicts also find variability across
cases. Studies have found that damages amounts increase with injury
would have awarded more, and in 23% the jury awarded more (totaling 44%). Id. I have adjusted
these numbers in the text to reflect percentages of the cases that the judge and jury agreed that




67. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40
ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 854 (1998) (citing The View from the Bench: A National Law Journal Poll,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 1).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 52, at 124-25 (describing a study testing the
effectiveness of judicial admonishments and noting the variability and unpredictability of the jurors'
damage determinations); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering, " 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 919-24 (1989) (discussing the variability and
unpredictability of awards and why variability in damages determinations is problematic).
70. Diamond & Casper, supra note 58, at 557.
71. Id. at 521.
72. Id at 553.
73. See Schkade et al., supra note 58, at 1140-41 (finding that deliberation increased the
awards over individual evaluations made prior to deliberation). This study divided 3,000
prospective jurors into 500 six-person juries and asked them to deliberate on a mock personal injury
case. Id. at 1140. There remains a question of whether the observed increase in awards was
justified.
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severity.74 These same studies found variability between juries hearing cases
of similar severity.75 Because these studies are of archival verdicts, it is hard
to know whether the cases they are comparing were in fact sufficiently simi-
lar across key variables such that the variation in verdicts was unwarranted.
One study that found variability among juries hearing cases of similar injury
severity also noted that there may have been differences between the injuries
in question that resulted in the higher awards in some of the cases, but that
these differences were not accounted for in the data.7 ' For example, the
study did not take into account the different ages of the plaintiffs or other
salient factors that would legitimately affect pecuniary damages.n
Since both archival and simulation studies confirm some variation in
awards in similar cases, the natural question is whether that variation is spe-
cific to juries or present across all decision makers. Simulation studies
demonstrate with some confidence that variation is present across the board.
In one study conducted by Neil Vidmar, medical malpractice arbitrators
(lawyers and judges) and potential jurors were given the same simulated
medical malpractice case in which the doctor had admitted liability." The
mean and median awards for both groups were around $50,000.7 The
awards in the juror group fell between $11,000 and $197,000 while the range
for the legal professionals was from $22,000 to $82,000.80 This demonstrates
that there is variability among both laypersons and experts. When the
researchers studied a sample of 100 twelve-person mock juries who
deliberated on the same case file, they found that the awards ranged between
$29,500 and $69,000, making the awards of the twelve-person juries less
74. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 52, at 161-62 (noting that damage awards in personal
injury cases were higher in cases involving "serious injuries such as loss of hands, legs, or eyes, or
for a wrongful death"); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 69, at 921 (finding that injury severity directly
influences the level of damages in that "more severe injuries result in larger recoveries").
75. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 52, at 162 (analyzing two categories of personal injury
claims-"[c]laims that involved wrongful death, medical malpractice, products liability, and street
or sidewalk hazards" and "claims involving automobile accidents or injuries on someone else's
property"-and asserting that "[e]ven when the seriousness of the injury was similar, someone hurt
in an automobile accident was likely to receive only one-third of the money that someone hurt in a
workplace accident received"); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 69, at 924 (noting the absence of
"horizontal" equity with the extent of variation within a single category of cases with similar injury
severity); see also Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards in Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict
Adjustments of Those Awards, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 280-99 (1998) (evaluating special verdict
sheets in medical malpractice cases and finding some variability in the proportion of awards for
noneconomic damages in relation to injury seriousness).
76. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 69, at 923-24.
77. Id. at 923.
78. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 890-91
(1993).
79. Id. at 892.
80. Id at 901 tbl.1.
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variable than those of the legal professionals." It is not clear how to square
these studies with those finding that deliberation increases the size of awards.
Yet studies also show that jury awards do not differ substantially from
those judges and lawyers would give. One study by Roselle Wissler, Allen
Hart, and Michael Saks (the Wissler study) interviewed respondents, includ-
ing potential jurors (whose names were obtained from the phone book), civil
82judges, and lawyers. The researchers summarized two cases over the phone
for study participants and asked them "how much money they would award
the plaintiff for general damages, how much they thought the average juror
would award the plaintiff, and to rate the plaintiffs injury on five
dimensions."83 The study found that injury ratings were predictable based on
the case descriptions and that sociodemographic factors did not substantially
affect injury ratings among jurors, judges, or lawyers.84 In the translation to
monetary awards, the researchers found greater variance.85  Sociodemo-
graphic factors had only a small effect on the amount awarded by jurors,
judges, and lawyers.86 It is not clear what effect deliberation would have had
on these findings.
In the Wissler study, defense lawyers' monetary awards were the most
predictable. The researchers hypothesized that this predictability may have
been due to a more mechanical assessment of damages.87 Because the
scenarios presented to potential jurors, judges, and lawyers over the phone
did not simulate the elements of a trial and did not contain all the information
an adjudicator would ordinarily have in deciding a case (such as the mock
plaintiffs' history prior to the injury), 8 it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
81. Id. at 897.
82. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 766-69 (1999). The researchers interviewed
558 potential jurors from urban and rural settings in two states, 244 judges, and 248 lawyers. Id at
767-68.
83. Id. at 769.
84. Id. at 782. For all groups, none of the sociodemographic characteristics made a "significant
contribution" to overall severity; however, defense lawyers differed from jurors, judges, and
plaintiffs' lawyers in that mental suffering had a greater effect on injury severity than disability. Id.
85. See id at 783 ("In contrast to the high degree of predictability of perceptions of injury
severity, models for general damages awards show less predictability and greater decisionmaking
complexity.").
86. See id. at 784 ("[Jlurors gave larger awards when they saw the injuries as involving a
greater degree of disability and mental suffering and when the jurors were male or had a higher
household income."). The researchers hypothesized that the order in which jurors were given case
summaries had a significant effect on variation. See id at 794 ("[Hlad we been able to include an
order term in the jurors' model to reflect the fact that there was a significant order effect for jurors
(which was not found for the other groups), the error variance for jurors likely would have been
reduced.").
87. See id. at 794 ("The somewhat lower variability in awards for defense lawyers when the
same person was reacting to different injuries suggests they may be less responsive to case
details.").
88. See id at 795 n. 104 (noting that judges and lawyers sought information that was not legally
relevant, "which revealed their own search for shortcuts to estimating general damages").
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from the study. The study subjects may have been importing their own
assumptions about the scenario, affecting their assessment of damages.
In sum, there is some evidence of variability in jury awards, although
not in jury evaluations of severity of injury. Evidence that variability in jury
awards is greater than among lawyers or judges is weak. All three groups
reach outcomes that are subject to unexplained variability. Because extant
empirical studies are flawed or incomplete, it is unwise to draw firm conclu-
sions from them.
C. Lawyer Valuations ofinjuries
Lawyers have a holistic perspective on damages, just as jurors do. As
one plaintiffs attorney told a researcher, "[I]n most instances a jury has a
figure in mind, and when you have a figure in mind, it can come in the guise
of compensatory damages or in the guise of punitive damages." 90 It makes
sense for lawyers to look at cases holistically because most cases settle, and
they settle for a single number. Lawyers on both sides may argue about what
types of damages they think are likely to be awarded in a given case. At the
end of the day, however, the overall damages award is more important to
lawyers and juries than are legal categories.
Studies comparing lawyers to juries have found that lawyers' estimates
of the value of a given case are also variable. The Wissler study discussed in
the previous subpart found variation among plaintiffs' attorneys, defense
attorneys, and judges.9' As one would predict, plaintiffs' attorneys awarded
higher damages on average than did defense attorneys.92 Another study
assigned lawyers to the role of plaintiffs attorney and defendant's attorney;
both were given the same documents to review. 93  Researchers found
substantial variation in case valuations within each group.9 4  Variation is
found among other professionals as well. For example, scholars have noted
the differences among insurance adjusters in valuing claims.95
Even if a lawyer's valuations are more predictable than a juror's, that
does not mean they are better. Because tort cases are rarely tried, most com-
parable values come from settled cases informed by the outcome of pretrial
89. Id. at 795.
90. Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 227.
91. Wissler et al., supra note 82, at 810.
92. Id. ("Averaged over all cases, jurors and plaintiffs' lawyers tended to give the highest
awards, defense lawyers the lowest, and judges gave an intermediate amount.").
93. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 6 (1983).
94. Id. at 6-7 & tbl.1-1.
95. E.g., Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1214-15, 1222 (1992).
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motions that are either partially or wholly dispositive of a case.96 In cases
resolved through negotiation, settlements are based largely on the lawyers'
sense of the "market" in settlements and verdicts.9 7 Lawyers develop a sense
of the "going rate" of settlement with respect to a particular set of cases, of
which their client's case is but one. 98 This going rate is determined by com-
parison to other cases. 99 By comparing the outcomes of similar cases,
lawyers can evaluate what the outcome should be in their client's case.
Statisticians call this method "convenience sampling."100 Convenience
sampling is a form of inductive reasoning based on establishing consistency
of a given case with a nonrandom sample of cases readily available to the
researcher.' 0 While convenience sampling bears some rough similarity to
qualitative social science research methodology, it is flawed. Good social
science methods require a random sampling to avoid bias. 102
A sampling process based on anecdotal evidence culled from whatever
cases the lawyer may have come across is vulnerable to bias. The lawyer
may only see a particular subset of cases. Defendants and insurers have an
interest in hiding larger settlement amounts to protect themselves in
negotiation. In some areas there may be competition among lawyers and a
disinclination to share information about settlement amounts. Moreover,
embarrassment or the fear of spurring litigation may encourage defendants to
require secrecy as a condition of settlement. 03 It is possible that lawyers will
have access to a comprehensive universe of cases-for example, because
they are repeat players in a discrete geographic and legal space-but there is
little reason to count on this being the case most of the time. Unfortunately,
little empirical evidence exists regarding the datasets possessed by lawyers or
the methods lawyers apply to those datasets. There is no reason to trust that
a sampling method based on the cases the lawyer happens to know about will
yield a reliable assessment of the value of a particular case relative to similar
cases.
96. Cf Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 459, 525 (2004) (listing factors other than
legal doctrine that influence settlements).
97. Cf Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485,
1532-33 (2009) (explaining that settlement negotiators and insurance adjusters have a common
understanding of certain injuries' values).
98. Id. at 1533.
99. See id at 1533-34 (noting that going rates bear some relation to past trial verdicts but that
claims are assigned value mainly based on agreed-upon formulas).
100. VoonChin Phua, Convenience Sample, in I THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 197, 197 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. eds., 2004).
101. Id
102. See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 929, 935-36
(2011) (discussing the importance of randomization in the design of statistical experiments).
103. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REv. 867, 878 (2007). On the ethics of such secret settlements, see
generally Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers'
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481 (2008).
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Finally, sometimes settlement amounts are not based on jury verdicts or
comparable settlements but on the limits of the defendant's insurance
coverage. Insurance in these cases acts as a cap on damages so that the
assigned value of a case will be more closely tied to the defendant's coverage
than the plaintiffs condition.10 4 As a method of injury valuation, insurance
coverage is arbitrary. It is an important reminder, however, that in the real
world, damages awards are driven by a variety of factors, not all of which are
consistent with the applicable (and admittedly ambiguous) legal standards.
D. The Matrix: Claims-Administration Facilities
The process of settling mass torts mimics on a grand scale the process
lawyers use to resolve ordinary cases, except that lawyers have better access
to data about the universe of related cases. Lawyers will look to the pool of
jury verdicts and previous settlements, the range of injuries, and the likeli-
hood of a liability finding in order to determine what their clients' cases are
worth. The history of tort law in the United States demonstrates that this
type of "scheduling" of tort cases has been the norm since the Industrial
Revolution. 05 Mass tort litigation exposes the fact that how litigants are
treated in relation to one another is an important, if neglected, element of
procedural justice.
In mass torts, judges oversee a resolution process that some have called
a temporary administrative agency. 06  Lawyers determine compensation in
the individual case based on a preset amount according to various factors
such as injury severity. This process is sometimes referred to as
"scheduling" damages and often involves creating a matrix and a point
system. 107
104. Cf Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action,
35 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 275, 281-83 (2001) (quoting personal injury attorneys who express clear
preferences for receiving judgments from a defendant's insurance money rather than blood
money-"money that individual defendants pay from their own funds").
105. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability ofAggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571, 1585 (2004) (explaining that
beginning in the 1880s, work injuries were often compensated by using standardized settlement
practices).
106. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2020 (1997); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA,
MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 97, 223 (2007) (discussing grids used in mass tort
settlements that match injuries with payouts); see also Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of
Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1803 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of
settlement-administration facilities); Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution
Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1361, 1361-62 (2005) (same).
107. See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 188 (2001) ("In mature mass
torts, where there may be a widely-shared understanding of the value of certain types of claims,
thousands of lesser-value claims may be resolved en masse according to negotiated schedules of
damages that pay little attention to individual claim differences and involve little adversarial
litigation."); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 38
(1991) ("While in theory and in form each case is separate, in practice lawyers on both sides deal
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The Vioxx litigation was settled using such a matrix. os Vioxx was a
painkiller that was associated with a higher risk of heart attack and stroke.'0 9
Thousands filed lawsuits against Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx.o10
These lawsuits were ultimately consolidated in a few state courts around the
country and in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana."' After a number of trials yielding mixed outcomes, the parties
settled.1 2 Because the lawsuits could not be consolidated in a settlement
class action, Merck sought a mechanism that would allow it to settle with all
the plaintiffs and achieve a global closure of all the Vioxx cases pending
against it. Merck agreed to pay approximately $5 billion, but the settle-
ment would only come into effect if 85% of the plaintiffs in each of several
categories agreed to be bound by it.' 14
The settlement provided that Merck would put $4.85 billion into a
settlement fund that would be administered by a third-party claims
administrator."' In order to be eligible to collect from the fund, plaintiffs
would first have to demonstrate that they had suffered either a heart attack or
stroke and that they had taken Vioxx over a certain period."' 6  After
determining whether a claimant was eligible, the claims administrator was to
score the claim. The claimant would receive a number of points depending
on how serious their stroke or heart attack was, how long they had taken
Vioxx, their age, and the presence other risk factors such as diabetes or heart
disease.'17 The basis for creating this system was a series of bellwether trials
held over a period of several years. 18  Claimants with more serious
conditions and who had taken Vioxx for longer durations would receive more
points; claimants who had suffered less serious heart attacks or strokes, had
with the cases as a group, sometimes making 'block settlements'-in which defendants give a
lawyer representing a group of plaintiffs money that is then allocated among a set of clients.").
108. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 21, at 279 (describing the Vioxx settlement
agreement where claimants were scored on a point system).
109. Id. at 266.
110. Id
11. Id. at 277-78.
112. See id. at 278 ("Looking toward the possibility of settlement, both Merck and the
plaintiffs' lawyers undoubtedly knew what the win-loss record suggested: a plaintiffs chance of
winning a verdict at trial was less than one in three, and the chances after appeal were closer to one
in six. On the other hand, both sides also knew that juries awarded punitive damages in all five of
Merck's losses. Moreover, the compensatory damages for pain and suffering were high in all five
cases. In other words, five juries [out of eighteen] found enthusiastically for plaintiffs.").
113. Id at 275-76.




118. Id at 278; see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576,
602 n.145 (2007) [hereinafter Lahav, Bellwether Trials] (discussing Merck's strategy);
Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2369, 2394 & nn.106-07 (2008) [hereinafter Lahav, Recovering Social Value] (collecting Vioxx
trial outcomes).
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taken Vioxx for shorter periods, or had other risk factors would receive fewer
points.11 9 Claimants would not know what their settlement amount was
before enrolling in the settlement; they would only find that out once the
claims administrator had determined their eligibility and scored their
claim. 120 The Vioxx settlement is different from those that came before in
that the individual claimants did not know the amount of their settlement
before agreeing to it. 12 1
The biggest difference between a mass tort settlement such as Vioxx
and an "ordinary" individual case is that a mass tort case exposes the private,
hidden aspects of the tort system. The awards given out by mass tort claims
administrators can be publicized and made centrally available, in contrast to
the ordinary case where comparable values are not easily accessible. This
transparent process requires judges and policy makers to think more thor-
oughly about the problems raised by assigning damages based on sampling.
It also highlights the often-ignored valuation problems inherent in "ordinary"
litigation. Claims-resolution facilities shift our attention from the individu-
alized trials that are often the focus of the procedural law to the quality of
outcomes. A shift of focus from the right to participation to equal treatment
reveals how the process of damages valuation is always comparative,
although this comparison is often invisible.
II. The Case for Outcome Equality in Litigation
Part I defined the problem of unexplained variability in outcomes in
similar tort cases. The process of monetizing injury involves the culturally
contingent assignment of value, rather than approximation or divining of
"true" value. This results in variation in the outcomes of similar cases
among juries and legal professionals. These variations are often hidden from
view in the ordinary case and revealed in the mass tort context. This part
considers the case for outcome equality and explores the doctrinal support for
an equality principle.
The legal system tolerates a great deal of inconsistent treatment of like
cases. The reason for this tolerance is not that such inconsistency is in itself
a virtue. Rather, inconsistency is accepted because it is the result of a prefer-
ence for decentralized decision making, which makes equalizing outcomes
among litigants very difficult. Because courts centralize mass tort cases in
119. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 21, at 279.
120. Id at 280. An online calculator was made available to help plaintiffs estimate what they
would receive in the settlement. Vioxx Settlement Calculator, OFFICIAL VIoxX SETTLEMENT,
www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/calculator.
121. Compare Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 21, at 271-72 (noting that in the 1990s, prior to
the Supreme Court's decisions in Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the preferred device to achieve settlements in mass tort
cases was a settlement class action), with id at 279-80 (describing the structure of the Vioxx
settlement and noting that this "structure meant that claimants had to decide whether to enroll
before knowing what their payments would be").
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one courtroom, the mass tort context gives judges an opportunity to promote
equality that is not available in ordinary litigation. In the absence of other,
competing goals (such as decentralized adjudicators or the right to a jury
trial), it is a general principle of law that similar cases ought to reach similar
outcomes. Doctrinally, the principle requiring equality of outcomes is
weakly supported, but it nevertheless remains an aspirational principle. For
example, we would expect a single adjudicator to reach the same liability
findings and award the same amount of damages when deciding functionally
identical cases. If these cases were treated differently despite appearing to be
the same, the adjudicator ought to provide a reason for the inequitable
treatment.
A. Equality, Reason Giving, and Respect for Persons
Outcome equality is rooted in "the basic principle of justice that like
cases should be decided alike."l22 In legal philosophy, there is a debate about
whether equality is a principle that we should evoke at all. Two strong
objections to outcome equality have been that equality begs the key question
of which cases are in fact alike and that what is really at issue when equality
is invoked is the duty to apply the law correctly.
Some philosophers argue that formal equality-the principle that like
cases ought to be decided alike-is really an empty concept because it begs
the key question of which cases are alike. 123 The answer to that question can
only be determined by reference to some other normative principle about
which similarities and differences matter and why.124 In the type of tort cases
122. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005). Because we also tolerate a
great deal of inconsistency, more work remains to be done to justify and refine this equality
principle. For a different approach to accessing the role of equality in tort law, see, for example,
Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12 LEGAL THEORY 181,
182 (2006) (proposing a "criterion of strong egalitarian fairness to evaluate the normative principles
and institutional practices dealing with accidental injuries and risk creation" and arguing in favor of
rules that reduce "the operation of undeserved luck in the operations ofjustice").
123. See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RHETORICAL FORCE OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) (focusing on the
confusion created by resorting to principles of equality); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1256 (1997) (arguing that "prescriptive equality" is a self-contradictory
norm); Westen, supra note 27, at 596 (arguing against the use of equality as a normative principle).
For some responses to these arguments, see generally Steven J. Burton, Comment on "Empty
Ideas": Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983);
Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Kent
Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1997)
[hereinafter Greenawalt, Prescriptive Equality]; Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian
Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000); and Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1350 (1991) (reviewing WESTEN, supra).
124. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 79-97 (2d prtg. 1991) (discussing the role of popular ideas about difference and
how they operate as unstated assumptions generated by institutions). For example, a robust
consideration of equality might also include principles such as antisubordination, in which case
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discussed here, the demand for treating injured plaintiffs similarly requires
the adjudicator to establish what parts of the plaintiffs' stories matter for pur-
poses of assessing damages. The principle that like cases ought to be treated
alike, standing alone, does not help the adjudicator in this inquiry. A variety
of factors, such as the events leading to the injury, the plaintiffs' charisma,
prior medical history, or the lawyer's talent and experience, may influence
the damages award. The adjudicator ought to use only legally relevant varia-
bles to determine which members of the plaintiff population are alike.
Asserting that similarly situated plaintiffs ought to be treated similarly is the
beginning of the inquiry, not the end of it. 12 5 Because the law of torts is open
to multiple interpretations, this is not an easy task, but as the description of
the use of matrices in the previous part demonstrates, it is possible.
Relatedly, some have argued that the principle that like cases be treated
alike is in fact derivative of the duty to apply the law accurately.' 2 6 Instead
of saying that like cases ought to be treated alike, the argument goes, we
might more correctly assert that the adjudicator should accurately apply the
law in all cases.127 If the adjudicator accurately applies the law to each case,
then similar litigants will be treated similarly.12 8 But this argument is based
on a flawed assumption about the application of law to facts. It assumes a
type of mechanical jurisprudence that yields automatic answers to legal
questions, which does not describe the realities of tort litigation. With dam-
ages in particular, the adjudicator must value injuries based on standards that
can yield a variety of plausible results.129  In other words, reasonable fact
treating minorities who have been historically discriminated against better than others who have not
suffered discrimination is understood as promoting equality. The Supreme Court has moved away
from this richer, antisubordination understanding of equality in its recent desegregation
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
709-11, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion) (striking down a student assignment plan that relied on race
classification intended to integrate schools in a de facto segregated community).
125. As Professor Chemerinsky has stated,
To infer . . . that because equality is insufficient it is also unnecessary is to commit a
basic logical fallacy. There is a fundamental difference between necessary and
sufficient conditions.
... Equality is morally necessary because it compels us to care about how people are
treated in relation to one another. Equality is analytically necessary because it creates
a presumption that people should be treated alike and puts the burden of proof on those
who wish to discriminate. Finally, the principle of equality is rhetorically necessary
because it is a powerful symbol that helps to persuade people to safeguard rights that
otherwise would go unprotected.
Chemerinsky, supra note 123, at 576 (footnote omitted); see also Greenawalt, Prescriptive Equality,
supra note 123, at 1268 ("The fact that the formal principle [of 'equals should be treated equally']
might otherwise be 'empty' has struck me as a solid reason to ascribe ... content to it.").
126. See Simons, supra note 123, at 728 (describing this argument but not agreeing with it).
127. Id. at 723.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part 1. When adjudicators use short cuts to determine damages, they may not be
accurately applying the law. See Wissler et al., supra note 82, at 795 n. 104 (noting in jury study




finders can disagree about of the amount of damages in a given case. The
valuation of injury is an art more than a science. As demonstrated in Part I,
the guidelines of the current rule structure are porous, meaning particular
damages claims can fall into one of several doctrinal categories. It is not suf-
ficient to tell the adjudicator to apply the formal legal rules without more,
because these rules are malleable and do not provide a consistent metric for
monetizing injury. This is the reason why tort damages can vary in similar
cases. But the fact that reasonable fact finders might disagree is not suffi-
cient justification for awarding different amounts to similarly situated
litigants. The law should strive for better than a random (or worse yet,
biased) assignment of damages based on the identity of the fact finder.
Proponents of the idea that, instead of equality, we should speak of a duty to
correctly apply the law might get to the same place as an equality principle if
they assume that legal standards applied similarly in similar cases will reach
similar results. What equality adds is an additional component to the mea-
sure of justice, that similar outcomes be reached in similar cases even where
correct law application results in inconsistency.
On the ground, lawyers evaluating mass tort cases already promote
outcome equality by comparing cases in order to determine value, although
they do not do so rigorously or systematically. Part of that "art" of deter-
mining damages among members of the legal profession is to consider how
the injuries of other, similarly situated persons were monetized. 13 0
Accordingly, in valuing tort cases, the duty to apply the law correctly is only
part of the valuation process. Another part of that process is comparative.
For this reason, equality in the context of adjudication is a comparative right;
it considers the relative treatment of different individuals.13 1 Comparative
treatment is entrenched in procedural doctrines such as remittitur, which
allows the judge to offer the plaintiff a choice between reduced damages that
are more in line with verdicts in similar cases or retrying the case. 3 2
Similarly, where the defendant has a limited fund from which to draw to pay
plaintiffs, the class action rule permits all the plaintiffs' claims to be adjudi-
cated together in a mandatory class action and the proceeds divided among
them.'33 As a result, some litigants might receive a lower award than they
would have had there been no class action. A similar procedure is available
in bankruptcy for "insolvent debtor[s] facing . . . asbestos liability."l34 The
rationale for this procedure is that it prevents injured parties from being
denied recompense merely because they file after the defendant's assets have
130. See supra subpart I(C) (describing valuations of injuries by legal professionals as based on
comparison with like cases).
131. Simons, supra note 123, at 709-12.
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
134. See In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 & n.45 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 11
U.S.C. § 524(g)); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 106, at 161-82 (describing bankruptcy
proceedings as a way of resolving mass torts).
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been exhausted.135 This procedure also compares individuals to one another
in order to rectify inequalities that result from timing.
To the extent that it is a comparative right, the principle of outcome
equality in litigation ought to be understood as imposing a requirement that
the adjudicator give a reason, supported by the legal framework, for treating
one injured person differently than another, apparently similarly situated
person.136 The argument in this Article centers on that idea. Sampling and
other forms of Trial by Formula force adjudicators to give reasons for treat-
ing similarly situated people who were injured in similar ways differently
from one another. The practice of informal sampling in aggregate litigation
demonstrates that in being forced to give reasons for how similarly situated
people are treated, adjudicators produce a system that is fairer across the
board than individual, decentralized litigation.
The process of reason giving is more likely to result in outcomes that
realize the ideal of equal treatment than our current system. The strongest
argument against this conception of outcome equality is that true outcome
equality is impossible to achieve in practice. There may be important indi-
vidual characteristics that the more flexible, decentralized system of case-by-
case adjudication or settlement is able to consider that would be ignored in a
statistical-adjudication procedure. For this reason, the current system may be
better at doing justice in the individual case. One response to this argument
is that doing justice in the individual case also requires equal treatment of
similarly situated persons. But it is clear that the risk posed by a system that
values equality over liberty is a risk of error-the risk that salient differences
between litigants will be missed. The risk posed by a system that values lib-
erty over equality is a risk of a different error-the risk that ignoring salient
similarities between litigants will lead to arbitrary or biased results.13 7 No
system will be perfect, but one that requires a justification for differential
treatment is superior to one that permits unexplained inequality of outcomes
to persist.
135. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-35 (1999) (observing that the intent
behind Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is to protect absent class members when the defendant has limited funds);
see also In re Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 234 n.45 (describing the bankruptcy procedure's
requirements as being "tailored to protect the due process rights of future claimants").
136. Simons, supra note 123, at 748 ("An equality principle requires the decisionmaker to
explain why he departed from the rule in some but not all cases.").
137. Another way to conceptualize a similar idea is to consider the equality right at stake here
as the right to a fair distribution of the risk of error rather than a right to the same outcome for
similarly situated persons. See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1011, 1016-17 (2010) (discussing fair risk distribution in relation to the moral right at stake in
effectuating the substantive law). For the mass tort context, it seems to me that discussing the right
in terms of actual outcomes rather than distribution of risk makes sense. The right at stake is the
same of each litigant, the procedures offered are the same-if the litigants are similarly situated,
why should they not receive the same damages award?
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The requirement that adjudicators provide an explanation is related to
Ronald Dworkin's concept of equal respect and concern.13 8 The scholarship
on procedural justice has long recognized the importance of dignitary values
in determining how much process is due. 139 Being treated equally and being
given legally legitimate reasons for unequal treatment is also part of the
respect for the dignity of individuals before the law. What makes participa-
tion meaningful is the capacity to influence the outcome. A system that
treats similarly situated litigants unequally also harms their dignity.
Justifying outcomes and demonstrating that like cases are treated
similarly also play a role in the moral legitimacy of the tort system.14 0
Inconsistent outcomes smack of arbitrariness and open the possibility that
results are based on invidious bias. One indicium of the fact that incon-
sistency erodes legitimacy is that critics of the tort system often point to
inconsistent outcomes as a basis of their critique.141 Transparency and reason
giving are necessary to the moral legitimacy of a court system in a
democracy.14 2 The justice system is a public good because it is the primary
system of law enforcement in our society. Citizens should be informed of
the workings of the court system, the manner in which cases are resolved,
and the ultimate resolution of those cases. For this reason, the resolution of
all cases, not only by judicial action but also by settlement, ought to be pub-
licly available. The processes by which mass tort settlements are reached,
138. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1978) (arguing that making a
moral decision, such as which of two children shall receive the final dose of a drug to cure some
illness, on the basis of a coin flip would fail to show equal concern); Simons, supra note 123, at
720-21 & n.97 (discussing Dworkin's theory of equal concern); see also Greenawalt, Prescriptive
Equality, supra note 123, at 1273 (arguing that the principle of equality "may express deep-rooted
feelings, not easily dispelled, to which decisionmakers appropriately are responsive").
139. For example, Jerry Mashaw has focused on procedure as an affirmation of individuality
and respect for persons through participation. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 888 (1981) ("[I]t is commonplace for us to
describe process affronts as somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not being
taken seriously as persons."). Although Mashaw focuses on equality of opportunity as part of
dignity, id. at 902-03, outcome equality is also a salient component of dignity.
140. See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 1893 ("Litigants will lose faith in adjudication as a means
of dispute resolution if outcomes appear to be random, or worse, if they appear to be biased."). For
discussions of legal legitimacy more generally, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the
Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) and Alan Hyde, The Concept ofLegitimation in the
Sociology ofLaw, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379, 407-18.
141. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-26 (2008) (lamenting
unpredictability in punitive damages awards), and Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998)
(describing variations in punitive damages awards despite juror agreement on reprehensibility), with
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variahility in Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcON. 11-13 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's reliance on summary statistics of variability and demonstrating that size of punitive
damages awards increases in a linear fashion with the size of compensatory damages awards in log-
transformed dollars).
142. See Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 772-
73 (2008) (discussing the relationship between court transparency and national security after 9/11).
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including sampling, public trials, and the creation of matrices for the alloca-
tion of damage awards, are a step in this direction.143 As discussed further in
Part III, they do not go far enough.
So far, this analysis has only addressed the issue of outcome equality as
a function of final determinations. But timing is also a critical component of
equality in adjudication. The order in which courts hear cases is central to
procedural justice. Delays can have negative effects on both parties. As a
prominent theorist explains, "Delay may have two different effects on a
decision: it may undermine accuracy in the sense that it increases the risk of
error, and it may undermine the practical utility of judgments for the purpose
of redressing rights."14 4 As time passes, events recede into the distance; wit-
nesses forget, disappear, or pass away. The passage of time compounds the
injury for plaintiffs awaiting compensation. It also makes pursuing cases
more difficult for lawyers working on a contingency fee basis, who must
fund the litigation going forward.14 1
For defendants, the effect of delay is mixed. On the one hand,
defendants in mass tort cases may suffer as investors wonder what the effects
of large-scale litigation will be on the company. On the other hand, delay
often favors defendants who benefit from any difficulties plaintiffs may have
in proving a case years after the fact. Defendants also benefit from putting
off payment of damages, should they be found liable. Finally, in some cases,
the passage of time permits changes in scientific thinking to coalesce, clari-
fying the causation inquiry. If the scientific studies vindicate the defendants'
position, new evidence can end the litigation.146
Timing and fairness in adjudication are in tension with one another.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure optimistically require that the rules be
"administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding."l 4 7 But often these considerations must be
traded off against each other. One can easily imagine a very inexpensive
summary proceeding that would not pay any attention to individual issues.
Such a regime would be unjust not only because it limits participant
autonomy, but also because it does not even attempt to give plaintiffs what
they are entitled to under the substantive law. Similarly, with enough
resources, it is possible to hold an individual trial in every case. Under
143. See supra subpart I(D) (describing the role of damages scheduling in increasing
transparency of the civil justice system).
144. A.A.S. Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure: The Case for Commuting
Correct Judgments for Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 360 (1994).
145. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 90-91 (2010) (describing how contingency fees boost plaintiffs' bargaining power
at the expense of transferring the risk of litigation to their attorneys).
146. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding scientific evidence inadequate to prove that breast implants caused systemic injuries
alleged by plaintiffs).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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current conditions (or any realistic improvement upon them), an insistence on
individual trials would mean long delays. Our system has resolved the ten-
sion between justice and speed by strengthening the procedures available for
settling cases in the pretrial phase and giving judges additional discretion to
resolve cases through pretrial or settlement conferences,14 8 dismissals at the
complaint stage,149 summary judgment, 1o judgment as a matter of law,'51 and
orders for a new trial.152 The tension between speed and fair outcomes is
resolved in each case by the operation of these procedural rules on the
ground-in other words, through judicial discretion. This is why focusing on
the procedural tools available to district judges and the way they use those
tools is critical to understanding how the right to outcome equality can be
operationalized.
In sum, the principle of outcome equality requires that similar litigants
ought to receive the same outcomes and provides a basis for giving reasons
for differential treatment. Reasonable adherence to outcome equality
demonstrates equal respect and concern for litigants. Furthermore, outcome
equality should be understood both in terms of comparing how much litigants
receive and when their cases are resolved. The next subpart will evaluate the
doctrinal support for the right to outcome equality both in the procedural law
and as a constitutional right.
B. Doctrinal Enforcement of Outcome Equality
Having considered the aspirational principle of outcome equality, we
turn to an investigation of the extent to which the subconstitutional rules of
the procedural law and the constitutional provisions of equal protection and
due process support a right to outcome equality. This analysis demonstrates
that judicial interpretations of the procedural laws and constitutional protec-
tions offer only limited recognition of outcome equality.
1. The Procedural Law.-Outcome equality is expressed in our civil
litigation system through a variety of procedural doctrines that attempt to
instill the discipline of consistency across cases.'" For example, preclusion
doctrines prevent the inconsistent outcomes that may result from relitigation
of the same case or the same issue. Remittitur disciplines outcomes by
allowing judges to reduce outlier verdicts. Both of these doctrines limit
litigants' day in court in favor of equality and consistency. A variety of other
doctrines, such as joinder and representative litigation, also encourage
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
149. FED. R. Ctv. P. 12(b).
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
153. See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 1884-92 (discussing the expression of different types of
equality in the rules of civil procedure).
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comparison and equalization across cases by allowing cases raising the same
issues to be decided in a single proceeding.
Claim preclusion forbids the relitigation of the same claim between the
same litigants. 5 4  Issue preclusion or collateral estoppel forbids relitigation
of the same issue in a subsequent case.155 The doctrine of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel permits a litigant to prevent his opponent from litigating an
issue that the opponent litigated in a previous suit.'56 Finally, the doctrine of
law of the case dictates that once an issue has been decided, it may not be
relitigated at a later stage in the same lawsuit.157 These doctrines are meant
to ensure that case outcomes are consistent.
But preclusion doctrine is too narrowly focused to do much work in
promoting equal outcomes across cases. Claim preclusion only applies to
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel) applies only to the same issue being relitigated by the
same party and cannot be used against a new party who never had the
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first place.1 5 9 To illustrate, consider the
classic bus accident hypothetical: There is a bus accident in which fifty pas-
sengers are injured and all fifty sue. 16 0 In the first suit, the defendant bus
company prevails; the court finds the bus company was not negligent. The
bus company cannot use that judgment against the second plaintiff because
that plaintiff was not a party to the first suit and did not have an opportunity
to litigate the question.161 Now imagine that in a third suit the plaintiff
prevails on the negligence issue. Can the fourth plaintiff use the findings of
negligence in the third plaintiffs suit against the defendant? After all, the
defendant was a party to and fully litigated the third suit. The answer is that
a court will not permit the fourth plaintiff to use the findings of the third suit
against the defendant, although formally speaking the court has the discretion
to do so. The Supreme Court has warned that plaintiffs who could easily
have joined the previous action (as the fourth plaintiff in this example could
154. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406, at 138-40 (2d ed. 2002).
155. Id.
156. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (upholding the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel); 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 154, § 4416, at 393 &
n. 17 (noting that Parklane Hosiery confirmed that collateral estoppel can be used by a plaintiff as
an offensive tool in a second action when that plaintiff was not a party to the first action).
157. 18B WRIGHT, MILLER& COOPER, supra note 154, § 4478, at 637-41.
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (defining the term claim for
purposes of claim preclusion).
159. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326-27 (noting the historic requirement of mutuality of parties
for use of collateral estoppel and that the Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), abandoned this requirement only with respect to
plaintiffs seeking to relitigate issues they had lost in a previous case).
160. See id. at 330 n.14 (citing Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 304 (1957)) (discussing Professor Currie's similar
hypothetical involving a railroad car).
161. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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have) should not be permitted to "adopt a 'wait and see' attitude" in the hope
of a favorable outcome in the first suit and later benefit from offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel knowing that they need not face the
consequences of an adverse ruling. 62 The Court has also cautioned that the
use of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel is unfair to the defendant "if
the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with
one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.",63
How broadly or narrowly courts define the issues at stake in a particular
litigation will also determine whether one outcome supersedes future
litigation. The problem of issue definition in preclusion doctrine raises a
fundamental difficulty for comparative valuation of injuries and for the right
to outcome equality more generally: What makes like cases alike? Even if a
court were to preclude subsequent litigation and thus prevent inconsistent
outcomes in one case, there is no guarantee that a particular outcome is con-
sistent with the value assigned to the underlying injury in comparable cases.
Because the concept of value in tort law is comparative, we can determine
value only by reference to a portfolio of similar cases. The tort system is still
searching for an acceptable method of determining what makes cases similar
for purposes of assigning value, and this is one reason injury valuation is
contested.
The doctrine of remittitur is another way the procedural law enforces
the principle of equality. Remittitur permits the court to reduce jury verdicts
that it believes are unreasonably high by allowing the plaintiff to choose
between a new trial and a reduced award.164 The court is supposed to arrive
at that reduced award by looking at the outcomes of comparable cases
decided by juries.165 This type of truncation is similar to what statisticians do
with outlier data points. Statisticians can recode the outlier datum or drop it
altogether on the theory that it represents some kind of mistake.166 But the
existence of the outlier may be an important clue to failures in the model
being used.167 In fact, an outlier may indicate that the model is flawed. In
the remittitur context, omitting the outlier becomes a problem when the
outlier is not an aberration but represents the direction in which valuation is
162. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the standard for remittitur in federal
court).
165. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (recognizing that remittitur
withstands Seventh Amendment attack but rejecting additur as unconstitutional); Joseph B. Kadane,
Calculating Remittiturs, 8 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 125, 125-26 (2009) (describing a method
used by one district court judge in analyzing comparable cases).
166. David J. Sheskin, Outlier, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RESEARCH DESIGN 979-81 (Neil J.
Salkind ed., 2010) (discussing outlier data and courses to take in statistical analysis when the outlier
is not considered an error).
167. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE 251 (2007) (arguing that, for the Gaussian model, it is better to understand when the
model cannot apply than to try to adapt the model to "non-bell curve" situations).
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moving.168 For example, the value assigned to a particular kind of injury
may increase over time. If that is the case, realignment through remittitur
will systematically prevent appropriate increases in damages awards. If
remittiturs are not granted systematically, which is likely in a decentralized
litigation system such as our own, changes in case value may increase the
difficulty of assigning value in future cases because this practice increases
unpredictability. Furthermore, remittitur favors lower valuations of injury.
Because remittitur is constitutional but additur is not, in the federal courts
(and at least some state courts), remittitur is a one-way ratchet.16 9 The doc-
trine lowers awards that are extraordinarily high but never raises awards that
are too low. In the latter case, the judge's only option is to grant a new trial.
A final set of procedural rules that contribute to equality of outcomes is
the rules governing party joinder and representative litigation. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide a very liberal regime for party joinder:
anyone can be joined in a lawsuit so long as a party alleges any "question of
law or fact common to all" the joined parties.170 The Rules also provide for
class actions, which allow individuals who share common "questions of law
or fact" to band together in a lawsuit collectively represented by a class
representative. 171 Only if the class is certified can the class members benefit
from the lawsuit jointly (and be bound by its results).17 2 Where individuals
are joined together in a suit, a reference class is created; they can be com-
pared to one another and the outcomes in each of their cases aligned. 73 In
some limited cases, the federal court may even enjoin competing actions
affecting a single stake against which multiple plaintiffs have claims.174
Finally, the multidistrict litigation statute and the rule governing consolida-
tion of actions permit the court system to combine actions raising common
issues of law or fact. 75
168. There is a debate about the significance of and reasons for an apparent increase in the size
of jury verdicts. See Vidmar, supra note 67, at 877-78 (describing and criticizing studies showing
inflation ofjury awards since the 1980s).
169. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486-87 (upholding remittitur but rejecting additur as
unconstitutional). But see Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251, 255 (Nev. 1984) (upholding additur
in a products liability case).
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(B) (governing joinder of plaintiffs); FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(B)
(governing joinder of defendants).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (outlining prerequisites for certifying class actions).
172. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379-80 (2011) (stating that a member of a
class that is not certified is not a party to the prior litigation and cannot be precluded).
173. See Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 2081, 2083-84 (2009) (discussing problems faced in determining the parameters of a
reference class and proposing a solution).
174. See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.2, at 703 (2d ed. 2009) ("[T]he federal
court overseeing an interpleader case may 'enter its order restraining [the claimants] from instituting
or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court affecting the [stake]."' (second
and third alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2006))).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (governing multidistrict litigation and permitting a panel of judges in
such situations to transfer actions raising common issues of fact to a single district for pretrial
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At the same time, the rules for required joinder and interpleader
demonstrate the procedural law's tolerance of inconsistent outcomes. The
fact that a series of suits may lead to inconsistent adjudications is not suffi-
cient to require parties to be joined under Rule 19.176 Similarly, the
interpleader rule permits persons to be joined as defendants only when their
claims "may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability." 7
Interpleader is generally used to address the problem of competing claims to
property so that the interpleader plaintiff will not be subject to inconsistent
obligations. Thus, for example, persons who may have a claim to an insur-
ance policy when the amount of that policy is less than the tortfeasor's
exposure can be brought into the same lawsuit under the doctrine of inter-
pleader and related statutes. Although interpleader has been used to
enforce equality between litigants who have claims against a limited fund, it
has not been used to address inconsistent adjudication of tort cases.
In sum, procedural doctrines such as remittitur, joinder, class actions,
and interpleader enforce a modicum of equality between litigants.
2. The Constitutional Dimension.-Both the Equal Protection Clause
and the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution could be the
basis for a constitutional requirement of outcome equality in litigation. Cur-
rently the law provides only a thin justification for such a requirement.'79
The Equal Protection Clause imposes some limited requirements of
equal treatment toward litigants. It requires that the government, including
the courts, treat all similarly situated persons alike.180  At the same time,
lawmakers may recognize relevant differences between individuals.'81 It is
familiar enough that equal protection doctrine singles out certain classifica-
tions for strict scrutiny. Laws that classify individuals based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, alienage, and religion must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest, 182 and laws that classify individuals based on gender are
proceedings); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (describing consolidation of actions involving common
questions of law or fact).
176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (outlining an exception to compulsory joinder: even if a party is
"required" under section (a)(1), if that party cannot feasibly be joined and the criteria in section (b)
weigh in favor of allowing the lawsuit to continue, the action can proceed without that required
party).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1).
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (stating that district courts have jurisdiction in the nature of
interpleader if "[t]wo or more adverse claimants ... are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such
money or property").
179. See Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 1896-97 (demonstrating that "constitutional equal
protection doctrine has not directly contributed to ensuring adjudicative outcome equality").
180. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
181. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) ("The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.").
182. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) and
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal
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subject to intermediate scrutiny.183 Decisions based on other classifications,
such as age, looks, height, or wealth, for example, are presumed to be valid
and subject only to rational-basis review, absent some subconstitutional
protection. 8 4  The same rationale applies to the Judicial Branch and to the
decisions of other persons deemed government actors, such as attorneys
exercising peremptory challenges in civil litigation.'8 5
The Supreme Court struck down race- and gender-based peremptory
challenges in civil cases.18 6 The Court reasoned that such challenges violate
the equal protection rights of jurors, who may be denied every citizen's right
to participate in the judicial system based on a discriminatory peremptory
challenge.18 7 Furthermore, the Court explained that "racial discrimination in
the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process, and
places the fairness of [the] proceeding in doubt."' 88 In other contexts, courts
have also found that taking race into account can violate the equal protection
rights of litigants. For example, in McMillan v. City of New York," 9 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
assessing damages based on statistical evidence of race as a predictor of life
expectancy violated the plaintiff's right to equal protection.' 90
To the extent that adjudicators, including juries, take an impermissible
classification such as race or gender into account when determining damages,
this is an equal protection violation. But this rule is very difficult to police
because the jury makes its determination in a "black box." With very few
Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1375, 1407 & n.141 (2010) ("Religion has been
included in the list of suspect classifications, albeit in dicta." (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam))).
183. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 ("A gender classification fails unless it is substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest." (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976))).
184. Id. at 440 ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
(citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); and Dukes, 427 U.S. 297); see also 42
U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of age in
programs receiving federal aid).
185. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that peremptory
challenges based on race violate the equal protection rights of jurors); see also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 15 (1948) (articulating the principle that the actions ofjudicial officers within their state
capacities are state actions within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
186. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616,
630.
187. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407-09 (1991)).
188. Id. at 630 (citations omitted) (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 411) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court went on to explain that "[r]acial discrimination has no place in the courtroom,
whether the proceeding is civil or criminal." Id. (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220
(1946)); see also Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 67
(2003) (describing the judicial function of norm elaboration in the context of equality).
189. 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
190. Id. at 255 ("Equal protection in this context demands that the claimant not be subjected to
a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a 'racial' classification.").
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exceptions, juror testimony about deliberations, including racially charged
remarks made by other jurors, cannot be introduced to impeach a verdict. 191
Moreover, statistical evidence of differential treatment of protected classes in
the court system will not give rise to an equal protection claim.19 2 Only in
cases such as McMillan, where the question before the court concerned the
introduction of statistical evidence taking race into account, is an equal pro-
tection ruling possible. Even then, the range of classes the Equal Protection
Clause protects is narrow and excludes myriad other considerations that may
result in litigants being treated inequitably. Thus, jurors may favor attractive
plaintiffs consistent with equal protection doctrine, even when beauty is not a
legitimate basis for injury valuation under the law. 93  In some cases, such
favoritism results in outcomes that are incorrect applications of the law to the
facts and are inequitable.
Equal treatment of similarly situated litigants could also be understood
to fall under the rubric of procedural due process. Due process has been
understood to be a liberty-based right of individuals in contradistinction to
the equality rights of groups. Procedural due process, therefore, has largely
been understood to require a determination of how much process is due to a
given individual, rather than as a comparison between similarly situated
litigants. 194  But liberty and equality claims are intertwined.' The
191. See FED. R. EviD. 606 (declaring that "a juror may not testify about any statement made or
incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations" during an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict); United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding
inadmissible juror testimony regarding racist remarks about Native Americans during jury
deliberations).
192. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that "a defendant who alleges
an equal protection violation has the burden of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination"'
and that the defendant therefore was required to prove that the "decisionmakers in his case acted
with discriminatory purpose" (quoting Whims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967))); Pers. Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979) (holding that a showing of disparate impact on a
protected group is insufficient to give rise to an equal protection violation absent a showing of
discriminatory purpose, in other words, that "the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
193. Sometimes beauty may be a legitimate basis, such as in cases where jurors are valuing a
disfiguring injury. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing juror valuation of
disfigurement).
194. The procedural due process cases have largely been about how to determine how much
process is due in a given case. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339, 349 (1976)
(describing the hearing required for termination of social security disability benefits).
195. Yoshino, supra note 8, at 748-49 (explaining that the Supreme Court's move from group-
based equal protection claims to individual-rights claims "reflects what academic commentary has
long apprehended-that constitutional equality and liberty claims are often intertwined"); see also
Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1541 (2002) (describing
how the representation-reinforcement and deliberative-democracy theories of judicial review
"conscript a basic equality as a means toward another end-liberty" and declaring that "[e]quality
and liberty are not as different as their histories in the case law have made them out to appear");
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L.
REv. 1183, 1216 (2000) (observing that once similarly situated people begin to see themselves as a
minority group, they transition from due process arguments to equal protection arguments to
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interrelationship of liberty and equality is evident in cases involving the right
to sexual or reproductive freedom or the right to equal access to the courts
for purposes of divorce.19 6 But the Supreme Court has also considered equal
treatment as a procedural due process right of defendants in punitive dam-
ages cases,19 7 in criminal cases, 198 and in considering the jurisdictional reach
of the courts.199
The Supreme Court has addressed the due process concerns triggered by
the variation in jury awards, specifically in its punitive damages
jurisprudence. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,2 00 for example, the Court
justified the requirement that punitive damages be consistent across cases on
the basis that defendants need to know what conduct will give rise to
liability. 20 ' The Court explained that "when the bad man's counterparts turn
advance their individual rights); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 380-81, 385-86 (1985) (describing how the Court in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), chose to address abortion limitations under a fundamental-rights
approach rather than using an approach based on sex equality); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of
Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REv. 99, 106 (2007) (describing
the Court's shift from unequal treatment to liberty of contract as a justification for striking down
business regulations); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008) (arguing that constitutional protections of
dignity in substantive due process cases and equal protection cases "vindicate, often concurrently,
the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality"); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897-
98 (2004) (describing the Court's due process case law as a "narrative in which due process and
equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly
interlocked in a legal double helix").
196. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) ("Persons in a homosexual relationship
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Courts are the central
dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and
poor alike. They fail to perform their function in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause if
they shut their doors to indigent plaintiffs altogether.").
197. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625-26 (2008) (stating that "[c]ourts
of law are concerned with fairness as consistency" and describing inconsistency and
unpredictability of punitive damages awards as a due process violation); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996) (observing that a reviewing court determining whether a punitive
damages award is a grossly excessive violation of due process should compare the punitive damages
award to civil or criminal penalties for comparable conduct).
198. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (noting that reducing "unjustified
disparities" in criminal sentencing is necessary to achieve "the evenhandedness and neutrality that
are the distinguishing marks of any principled system ofjustice").
199. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("The Due
Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the laws,' . . . gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
200. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
201. See id. at 2627 (concluding that a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity
so that one "can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing [a] course of
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up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them
with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak like
damage."2 02 Exxon evokes a principle of equal risk distribution among
defendants.
Outside of the punitive damages context, however, the doctrinal
structure permitting judges to enforce some level of consistency in jury
verdicts has been considered only a long-held rule of common law, not a
constitutionally imposed due process requirement.203 The constitutionality of
rules allowing judges to reconsider jury verdicts has therefore traditionally
been analyzed under the Seventh Amendment individual right to a jury trial
rather than as a problem of inequality or arbitrary treatment. 20 Furthermore,
our judicial system has consistently tolerated variations in jury verdicts. The
standard that permits judges to overturn verdicts only when no reasonable
jury could find for that party,205 for example, does relatively little to enforce
equality of outcomes among litigants.
In sum, there is a basis in the existing doctrine and the language of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses for establishing a right to outcome
equality in adjudication. That right has even been recognized by the
Supreme Court.206 But it has not been consistently imposed, and there is
substantial countervailing law and practice. The likelihood that a robust right
to outcome equality will emerge from the Supreme Court is low at present.
As described in the introduction, the Court has favored liberty over equality
in adjudication in many recent opinions. Nevertheless, with the existing
tools available to them, district court judges have pioneered innovative pro-
cedures that promote outcome equality. If these procedures were more
rigorous, they would do an even better job of supporting outcome equality
across litigants. Over time, the importance of outcome equality may even
trickle up to the Supreme Court.
III. Outcome Equality in Mass Tort Cases
Equality remains an important foundational principle of our civil
litigation system, even if the endorsement from the procedural law and
action"); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (stating that a defendant has an "entitlement to fair notice
of the demands that the several States impose on the conduct of its business").
202. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
203. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 488 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) (describing the
power of the judge to set aside a jury verdict as inadequate or excessive as a "rule[] of the common
law which [has] received complete acceptance for centuries").
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389 (1943)
(holding motions for directed verdict constitutional); Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486-87 (holding additur
unconstitutional).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
206. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2627 (noting that the unpredictable nature of punitive awards "is
in tension with the function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness
that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries in a system whose commonly held notion of law
rests on a sense of fairness in dealing with one another").
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constitutional provisions is limited. The resilience of this principle is most
evident on the ground, where judges are using their discretion to adopt
equality-promoting procedures. This part considers what judges have
already done to promote outcome equality in mass torts and analyzes what
could be done better.
A. The Emergence ofEquality: Informal Sampling
Recently, judges overseeing large numbers of tort cases collected in a
single forum under the auspices of the multidistrict litigation statute and sim-
ilar procedural devices have started using sampling techniques such as
nonbinding bellwether trials for "informational" purposes.207 This process of
court-engineered sampling is akin to what lawyers ordinarily do when they
compare similar cases to determine what damages award is appropriate, but it
is a somewhat more transparent and systematic approach. Because it
requires a comparison between cases, it is more equality promoting than
"ordinary" individual litigation.
In the late 1990s, a few trial courts experimented with binding
208
statistical-adjudication procedures. In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, a federal
court used statistical methods to adjudicate a class action brought on behalf
of persons who suffered human rights abuses under the regime of Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines.2 09 A special master conducted on-site depositions
in the Philippines, and based on those, he recommended a recovery schedule
to a jury, which then adopted his recommendations (for the most part).2 10
The Ninth Circuit upheld this procedure. 2 11 Around the same time, a U.S.
district court judge in Texas tried 160 asbestos cases and was prepared to use
those verdicts to extrapolate to the remainder of asbestos cases consolidated
before him.2 12 The Fifth Circuit quashed his efforts, holding that the
extrapolation of the results of the sample verdicts violated the defendants'
due process right and the Seventh Amendment.213 No trial court has fol-
lowed in the footsteps of these innovators, and the appellate courts continue
to express hostility to mandatory statistical adjudication of this type.
207. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323,
2332 (2008); see also Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and
Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006) ("[E]ven without
preclusive effect, [bellwether trials] offer an accurate picture of how different juries would view
different cases across the spectrum of weak and strong cases that are aggregated.").
208. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996), disapproved ofin Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2561 (2011).
209. Id. at 782.
210. Id. at 782-84.
211. Id. at 787.
212. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 666 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d
297 (5th Cir. 1998).
213. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 319.
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Sampling has resurfaced in the last five years as an informal method for
encouraging aggregate settlements rather than as a binding method for
resolving cases in the class action context. This sampling methodology uses
informational bellwether trials.2 14 This informal method has been used in
both state and federal forums. The most often cited example is the Vioxx
litigation, but there are many others.2 15 Sampling was used to encourage set-
tlement in In re September 11th Litigation (September 11th Litigation).2 16 A
sampling process was instituted in the related WTC Disaster Site
Litigation.2 17 Sampling has been proposed in the litigation over
formaldehyde-laden FEMA trailers,2 18 in the litigation arising out of the pres-
ence of methyl tertiary butyl ether in the water supply, 2 19 and in the Fosamax
litigation.220 Sampling was also proposed in the gender discrimination class
action against Wal-Mart to solve the problem that the case required
individual trials and was therefore not manageable as a class action, although
this plan was rejected by the Supreme Court.22 1
The WTC Disaster Site Litigation presents a particularly intriguing
approach to statistical adjudication.2 22 Approximately 9,090 plaintiffs filed
lawsuits against more than 200 defendants, alleging injuries arising out of
their exposure to harmful chemicals in the aftermath of the tragedy of
214. See Fallon et al., supra note 207, at 2332 ("The ultimate purpose of holding bellwether
trials ... was not to resolve the thousands of related cases pending ... but instead to provide
meaningful information and experience to everyone involved in the litigations.").
215. See, e.g., id. (noting the use of bellwether trials in In re Propulsid Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 1355, 2000 WL 35621417 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 7,2000)).
216. See Opinion Supporting Order to Sever Issues of Damages and Liability in Selected Cases,
and to Schedule Trial of Issues of Damages at 5, In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21 MC97_opinion
070507.pdf (scheduling six representative cases for trial on the issue of damages with the intention
that the jury verdicts would have applicability for other pending cases).
217. See Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, supra note 19, at 1-3 (dividing the
WTC Disaster Site Litigation cases into five groups and selecting sample cases from each group
based on severity, random selection, and the court's discretion).
218. See Pretrial Order No. 28, at 1, In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 07-1873 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/
FEMA07mdl873/Orders/orderl096.pdf (ordering the parties to submit "potential bellwether trial
plaintiffs").
219. See Opinion and Order at 1-2, 26, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/
cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2000cv01898/4606/2866/ (limiting the court's
holding regarding punitive damages to "the facts presented at this bellwether trial").
220. See Order at 1, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06 MD 1789 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y.
June 29, 2011), available at https://d83vcbxs8ojhp.cloudfront.net/pdflTrial%20Selection%20
Order.pdf (noting that the court had previously ordered the parties to "select two cases for trial as
bellwethers").
221. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1191-93 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2561 (2011).
222. See Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, supra note 19, at 1-3 (describing the
sampling process implemented by the court).
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September 11, 2001.223 The plaintiffs include New York City employees,
such as firefighters and police officers, as well as civilian volunteers and
others. 22 4 Judge Alvin Hellerstein appointed two special masters-both law
professors-to set up a sampling procedure to encourage settlement.2 25 They
developed a method for allocating the plaintiffs into groups. Sample cases
from each group would go forward as bellwether trials.
Under the experts' plan, plaintiffs were required to fill out
questionnaires regarding types of diseases they suffered and the severity of
their injuries.226 The information was entered into a database.2 27 The groups
were then organized based on type of illness and severity of the alleged
harm.2 28 Out of the first group of 2,000 cases, the special masters collected
200 of those alleging the most severe injuries, 25 additional cases of other
diseases that had not been included in the severity chart, and 400 cases cho-
sen at random.2 29 Of these, the judge picked two cases, the defense lawyers
picked two cases, and the plaintiffs' lawyers picked two cases, for a total of
six cases set to proceed through pretrial and trial.230 Judge Hellerstein
explained that this "allows the parties to get a good sense of the strengths and
weaknesses of all the cases" and presumably would lead to settlement.231
The judge later increased the number of bellwether trials to twelve,232 but
before any cases were tried, an aggregate settlement was reached.233
Judge Hellerstein's approach to the WTC Disaster Site Litigation is
typical of court-engineered sampling, which proceeds more or less as
follows: Among a large set of similar cases, the judge slates several for
223. Opinion Discussing Methodology for Discovery and Trials of Sample Cases at 6, In re
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2021mcO0100/58533/1138/
0.pdf.
224. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 2008).
225. The special masters are two very prominent torts professors: James Henderson of Comell
Law School and Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School. Opinion Discussing Methodology for
Discovery and Trials of Sample Cases, supra note 223, at 7 & n.3.
226. Id at 8.
227. Id at 7-8.
228. Id. at 10.
229. Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, supra note 19, at 1-2.
230. Opinion Discussing Methodology for Discovery and Trials of Sample Cases, supra note
223, at 11.
231. Mark Hamblett, Plan Is Implemented to Resolve Suits in WTC Cleanup, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25,
2009, at 1.
232. Mireya Navarro, Settlement Plan Drafted for Sept. 11 Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/nyregion/05zero.html; Alexandra D. Lahav,
Twelve Instead ofSix? Developments in the WTC Disaster Site Litigation, MASS TORT LITIG. BLOG
(Feb. 19, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass tort litigation/2010/02/twelve-instead-of-
six-developments-in-the-wtc-disaster-site-litigation-.html.
233. A.G. Sulzberger & Mireya Navarro, Accord on Bigger Settlement for Ill 9/11 Workers,




pretrial practice and trial.234 Lawyers litigate these sample cases through
discovery and summary judgment, pretrial motions, and even trial.235 When
these selected cases have settled or reached judgment, lawyers use the expe-
rience culled from them to settle all the other cases in the group because the
lawyers have developed a sense of the value of similar cases from the process
236
of litigating the sample cases.
Aggregate litigation presents opportunities to develop more rigorous
sampling methodologies, bellwether trials among them. Unlike the settle-
ment of the stand-alone case, courts can verify that the reference class is
appropriate, that the sample is chosen randomly, and that it is sufficiently
large to yield reliable results. The ordinary methods of case valuation do not
require-and are virtually never based on-anything approaching a rigorous
methodology. As a result, the ordinary trial process does not account for the
always-present potential that a settlement deviates considerably from the
average value the group of similar cases would have been assigned if all the
cases were to proceed to trial. It is very difficult to sample in individual tort
cases, but mass tort cases provide opportunities for developing a more rigor-
ous method for assigning damages because they are so often joined together
in one forum. At the same time, the informal methods that judges use in
these cases are not sufficiently rigorous to achieve outcome equality. The
remainder of this part considers the benefits of sampling and how to improve
upon current practices.
B. How Trial by Formula Promotes Outcome Equality
1. Extrapolation.-Cases raising the same questions of fact and law are
inevitably linked to one another. In a mass tort litigation, for example, many
clients are represented by relatively small groups of lawyers. Many cases
settle, and the amount of any individual settlement is determined by
reference to the outcomes in parallel adjudications and settlements. In other
words, lawyers determine outcomes on a comparative basis. Any
individual's award is dependent on how other cases are resolved. Sometimes
the dependent relationship between individual cases is made explicit, as in
the requirement in the settlement agreements in the WTC Disaster Site
Litigation and the Vioxx case that a large percentage of the plaintiffs accept
the settlement in order for the settlement to go forward.237
Although one settlement affects the price of another, individual cases
also differ from one another in relevant ways. Some individuals suffer more
234. Fallon et al., supra note 207, at 2342-43.
235. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, supra note 118, at 577.
236. See Fallon et al., supra note 207, at 2338 ("[B]ellwether trials can precipitate and inform
settlement negotiations . . . .").
237. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text (describing the WTC Disaster Site
Litigation and settlement); supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text (describing the Vioxx
settlement).
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because their injuries are of greater severity or because injuries of similar (or
even lesser) severity have caused more damage to them and their family.
The contingencies of social life and luck affect the extent to which an indi-
vidual is harmed. Renowned special master Kenneth Feinberg struggled with
this issue in administering the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
Numerous people perished in the terrorist attack of September 11th and
Feinberg was charged with compensating families and individuals who had
opted out of the tort system and agreed to have their compensation deter-
mined by the fund.238 Some were very rich and others very poor, but all
experienced terrible losses. In his book about the experience, Feinberg con-
cluded that he would have preferred to give identical amounts to all
claimants than to have to quantify the value of human life in the aftermath of
such a disaster, especially when those valuations reflect existing economic
inequality. 2 39
Since correcting preexisting inequality is not part of the doctrine of
damages in tort law, the litigation process may compound some of these
inequalities. Recognizing this, we ought to consider not only what
procedural devices produce equality between litigants, but also to what extent
the law enables or limits an adjudicator's ability to take into account these
contingencies in the process of assigning damages amounts to individual
cases. In considering the effect of sampling and extrapolation on litigants, it
is important to keep in mind the normative ideal of procedure: to make sure
that plaintiffs receive what they are entitled to under the substantive law.
With respect to the assignment of damages, that entitlement is not dictated by
precise legal standards and has a strong cultural and contextual element. 24 0
The easiest method for achieving outcome equality among litigants is to
average the outcomes of sample cases or settlements across the entire popu-
lation of plaintiffs. This is the method that has been discussed in the
scholarship, in part because more refined methods of extrapolation are more
. 241
expensive. In determining damages schedules for mass tort settlements,
lawyers do not use a pure averaging regime across all plaintiffs. Instead,
they appear to take into account a number of factors, as demonstrated by the
Vioxx calculator, which includes variables such as type of injury, severity of
injury, length of ingestion of the drug, the claimant's physical characteristics,
etc.242 Because this is what lawyers are doing on the ground-with judges'
help-this section will assume that sampling methodology will take into
238. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 21-26 (2005).
239. Id. at 182-83.
240. See supra subparts I(B)-(C).
241. See Bone, supra note 25, at 584-86 (noting that courts could perform a linear regression
over a sample instead of using a sample average but explaining that increasing the accuracy of any
such regression compels adding more variables into the model, requiring more measurements and
increasing costs).
242. Vioxx Settlement Calculator, supra note 120.
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account some objective factors such as those that were taken into account in
the Vioxx settlement.
Imagine a sample of cases is tried and half the plaintiffs are awarded
$100 and the other half awarded $50. The average award for this group of
plaintiffs is $75. If all the plaintiffs are assigned an award of $75, the plain-
tiffs who either did receive or would have received $100 are subsidizing
those that did or would have received $50, because the extrapolation process
awards them $25 less than they would have been awarded at trial. In their
article defending sampling, Michael Saks and Peter Blanck argued that this
outcome is justifiable compared with the baseline of individual trials because
the result of any individual trial is only one possible result out of many. 243
Saks and Blanck explained that "[e]very verdict is itself merely a sample
from the large population of potential verdicts."244 Assume for our simple
hypothetical that if a single plaintiff's case was tried a number of times and
these results were averaged, the average award would be $75. This is more
accurate than a verdict of either $100 or $50, because the first overcompen-
sates and the second undercompensates the plaintiff.2 4 5 The best estimate of
the "true" award is the average.246 The argument is that because the popula-
tion is similar to one another in all relevant ways, the average of a sample of
cases will yield the same "true" award as the averaging of a series of trials of
the same case under similar conditions.
One problem with this argument, as Saks and Blanck themselves
recognized, is that populations of plaintiffs are not homogenous in the real
world.247 Verdicts that fall far outside the population mean of the distribution
may represent real differences among plaintiffs. An extrapolation process
based on averaging erases these differences even though they are legally
relevant, thus violating the normative principle underlying the procedural
law: that plaintiffs should receive the measure of damages they are entitled to
under the substantive law. A simple hypothetical illustrates the point: A
group of people experienced damage to their hands. Most of the group is
made up of white-collar workers, but among them is a concert pianist.
Assume that the damages experienced by the concert pianist-who has lost
her livelihood as the result of the hand injury-are far greater than those
experienced by one of the white-collar workers. If being a concert pianist is
not a variable that can be considered in the averaging process, then the
243. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 23, at 833 (arguing that a damages award in an individual
tort case is just as much an estimate-and a more inaccurate one at that-of actual damages as a
sample average).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 834.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 837, 845; see also Bone, supra note 25, at 573 ("Because factual issues vary among
class members and cases are not homogenous with respect to damages, sample plaintiffs do not
represent those not sampled in the same way that plaintiffs in a small-claimant class represent
absentees.").
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presence of the concert pianist will distort that process. One kind of
distortion will occur if there is no concert pianist among the cases sampled
for trial. In that case, the extrapolation process will award the pianist an
amount far lower than she is entitled to. A second type of distortion will
occur if a concert pianist is included in the sample. Her presence will
increase the average award for white-collar workers who ought not receive
an increased award.
The problem of the concert pianist would be easily resolvable if the
procedure used for sampling can take her presence into account. For
example, the court could survey the population of plaintiffs to determine
whether there is a concert pianist among them. Presumably, being a concert
pianist is an objectively verifiable fact, and the sampling process can take the
presence of a concert pianist or two in the population into account in the con-
struction of the model. That is what makes this example an easy one. But
what about other variables that are not so easy to take into account in the
extrapolation process, either because it is too costly to survey the population
of plaintiffs or because these variables are not objectively verifiable and
therefore difficult to take into account in a statistical model? For example,
certain preexisting conditions may lower jury verdicts either because they
cause reduced life expectancy or because jurors have a tendency to be less
sympathetic to the underlying condition. There are ways to resolve the more
complex problems raised by real-world sampling in litigation,24 8 but before
considering them, it is worthwhile to step back and face the basic question
raised by sampling: What is the basis for assigning damages in a tort case?
The arguments about sampling in tort cases presented so far are based
on an underlying assumption that pervades the scholarship and the negative
precedent on sampling: there is an accurate measure of damages (the "true"
measure), and the job of the tort system is to approximate it.24 9 Whether that
accurate measure is a single number or a narrow range, the assumption is
more or less the same: there is an objectively verifiable number external to
the tort system against which the amount of damages awarded by the jury can
be measured. But what if that assumption is erroneous? Part I of this Article
attempted to demonstrate that even if such an objective measure of damages
were possible from a God's eye point of view, it is not available to mere
mortals. 25 0 Instead, uncertainty pervades tort law.
Consider the case of the $50 and $100 damage awards. If there is an
observable and legally justifiable reason why some cases fell into the $100
category and others into the $50 category, then the adjudicator must find a
248. See Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 17 CONN. INS. L.1
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3-6) (on file with author) (providing examples of random-
sampling techniques used in litigation).
249. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 25, at 577 (discussing the possibility that accuracy in damages
awards constitutes a "range" but also stating that "the more competent the jury, the closer its verdict
will be to the correct amount").
250. See supra subpart 1(A).
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way to distinguish between these two types of cases. But suppose everyone
suffered the same severity of injury. In that case, they all suffered a $75
harm. If the difference in the two outcomes represents variability for reasons
that we cannot measure or for reasons that we think are morally irrelevant,
such as plaintiffs' physical attractiveness or race,251 then redistributing the
difference between the two outcomes among the plaintiffs is the fairest
approach. This redistribution benefits the least well-off (a $75 plaintiff who
was awarded $50) at the expense of the best off (a $75 plaintiff who was
awarded $100).
When no legally defensible reason dictates outcomes, the primary
objection to the process of averaging falls away because averaging does not
redistribute awards from the most harmed to the least harmed. Instead, this
system distributes awards equally among those who are (more or less)
equally harmed. The key dispute is whether it is systemically acceptable to
treat equally plaintiffs who are (more or less) equally harmed, rather than
requiring that only identical plaintiffs be treated the same. Since no person is
identical to any other, a system that requires equal treatment only of identical
litigants will provide equal treatment to nobody. Sampling requires an
acceptance that the values assigned in tort cases can be extrapolated across
populations of similarly situated individuals because those values are
assigned (and contingent) rather than approximations of some inherent value.
This observation restates the basic tension between liberty and equality.
To accept this argument means accepting two additional assumptions.
First, variation in awards is not always justifiable. Awards may vary because
of the parties' race or gender, the quality of their lawyer, or other extralegal
factors. Studies show that at least some variation between verdicts in similar
cases is not related to the application of the substantive law but stems from
other factors-such as the plaintiffs' race-so that similarly situated black
plaintiffs receive lower verdicts than white plaintiffs. 2 52 Second, uncertainty
pervades the tort system. This phenomenon is widely recognized. For
example, as prominent tort scholars Kenneth Abraham and Glen Robinson
explain,
[I]t can hardly be denied that there is randomness in outcomes and that
this randomness is in substantial degree a function of insisting that
each claim be valued in isolation from any other. Any such
randomness must be seen as a flaw in the system that undermines the
system's accuracy and fairness.253
251. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 463, 465-66 (1998) (describing racial and gender disparities in tort damage awards and
settlements); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 How. L.J.
99, 136 (2005) (same).
252. See Wriggins, supra note 251, at 136 (citing one study that found that black plaintiffs
received awards that were 74% of what white plaintiffs received for comparable injuries).
253. Abraham & Robinson, supra note 26, at 147.
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While studies of jury verdicts have found that there is a correlation
between severity of injury and size of award, they have also found that jury
verdicts vary for reasons that we do not understand.254 If the variation is not
warranted by the facts of the individual case but instead is a result of
extralegal factors or noise, then it is not justified. Statistical analysis can
help start a conversation about what factors ought to be relevant and to what
extent verdicts or settlements are influenced by variables that ought to be
irrelevant.
Extrapolation by averaging is further justified because it benefits the
plaintiffs that are most harmed under the current regime by making certain
that unjustifiably low awards are equalized with the unjustifiably higher
awards of similarly situated plaintiffs. In the previous example, the plaintiffs
that are most harmed are those whose damages ought to have been assigned a
value closer to $100 but for unknown reasons receive only $50. Sampling
and extrapolation reduces the risk that a plaintiff will be assigned an outlier
award that is lower than the awards of comparably situated plaintiffs. This
same plaintiff gives up the chance to receive a higher award than similarly
situated plaintiffs by becoming part of the extrapolation process. This loss of
a chance to obtain an award at the high end of the range is not unfair.
Fairness requires that like cases be treated alike, that differences among
similarly situated persons be justified, and that individuals receive what they
are entitled to under the substantive law. It does not entitle plaintiffs to par-
ticipate in a lottery for the highest possible damages award. Limiting
unjustifiably high and low awards is a requirement for treating cases equally.
In sum, a sample picked randomly from the correct reference class will
yield fair results, so long as the extrapolation process is able to take into
account objectively verifiable variables and does not systematically devalue
certain categories of claims for socially undesirable and legally impermissi-
ble reasons. While sampling cannot correct underlying social inequality-
because this is not an aim of the substantive law-it can be a part of a proce-
dural system in which plaintiffs obtain what they are entitled to under the
substantive law.
This analysis leaves open some important concerns that will be
addressed later in this part. First, it is predictable that plaintiffs who have a
chance at higher value awards due to extralegal factors will opt out of a sam-
pling process that uses averaging if they are allowed to, causing it to
collapse. Second, what about subjective variables that are important to the
law, such as the plaintiffs experience of emotional distress? That is, how is
the adjudicator to deal with uncertainty in structuring the statistical model?
Third and finally, how can an adjudicator structure a sampling regime to
avoid bias? These issues will be addressed below.
254. See supra subpart 1(B) (describing studies of variance injury verdicts).
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Before turning to these concerns, however, two additional benefits of
sampling will be discussed. First, a sampling regime can be used not only to
determine case values but also to determine the order in which cases will be
heard. This permits adjudicators to order dockets to maximize equality
among litigants. Second, sampling promotes transparency, which is an
important value in its own right. Transparency also promotes equality by
permitting comparison between similarly situated litigants. The tort system
ordinarily obscures such comparisons.
2. Fairness in Timing and Case Management.-As noted in the earlier
discussion of the arguments in favor of equality, the timing of case resolution
255is a crucial component of fairness among litigants. Delay in a hearing
causes two problems. First, it may reduce accuracy because of the passage of
time. Second, it imposes an additional burden on the plaintiff with a valid
claim waiting for compensation. Sampling allows the judge to ameliorate
these twin problems of delay. First, by getting some cases underway, evi-
dence is brought forward while it is fresher in witnesses' minds. Second, by
favoring the most damaged plaintiffs in the order of cases tried or resolved, it
limits the most egregious effects caused by the wait for adjudication.
Arguably, the decision to resolve cases on a first come, first served
basis-as our system currently does-is fair in much the same way a lottery
is fair. Each litigant, no matter their importance outside the judicial system,
the subject matter of their case, or the extent of their injury, will be heard in
turn.256 To the extent that the timing of filing can be very roughly correlated
to the timing of the injury, it makes sense to allow those injured first to be
heard first.257 This approach (very roughly) solves the problem of unfair
timing by moving each individual's case forward in the order that they were
injured. Thus, all injuries are treated equally in a formal sense. First come,
255. See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text; see also Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling
Idea ofAdjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 577, 621-22 (2011) ("Assuming all plaintiffs have similar cases (as in a mass tort)
and that they file at different times because of chance events, . . . arguably there is good reason to
treat all of them equally.").
256. As a formal matter, jumping the line requires a showing of irreparable injury or imminent
harm. A temporary restraining order, for example, may be granted without notice to the other party
upon a showing of "immediate and irreparable injury," and if such an order is issued a preliminary
injunction hearing must take precedence over other matters. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)
(authorizing temporary restraining orders without notice); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3) (setting the
timing for a preliminary injunction hearing following grant of a temporary restraining order);
Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (observing that the four-part test for granting a
preliminary injunction includes consideration of the likelihood of the movant suffering irreparable
harm in the absence of the injunction). As a practical matter, judicial docket control adds some
discretion into the order in which cases are heard.
257. First come, first served would be a fair approach in cases where the timing of
manifestation of injury correlates to harm (that is, the most injured file first). It is less fair in cases
where the weaker cases are filed first. But "we do not usually associate lotteries with adjudication."
Bone, supra note 25, at 621.
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first served does not take special account of those who suffer most by
waiting, either because of evidentiary problems caused by delay or because
the cost of waiting is higher for them than for other litigants.
For the most harmed, the civil justice system allocates the timing of
litigation poorly. This problem is aggravated in cases where individuals
suffer injuries in and around the same time period. In that case, there does
not seem to be a good justification for privileging the savviest litigants or the
fastest filers when other individuals, who are not as quick or savvy but have
been harmed to the same or to a greater extent, languish. Instead, the court
should approach such litigation as if all cases were filed at once.
Once deciding to treat all cases in a mass tort as simultaneously filed,
the judge faces the question of what other criteria ought to be used to deter-
mine priority. Courts ought to order the cases in a way that most comports
with the ideal of litigant equality and with the principle that social institu-
tions such as the courts should be used for the common benefit. One option
is to choose the cases to be heard first on a random basis-by a lottery. This
would give everyone an equal opportunity to be heard in a timely manner.
Such a random selection would compound the harm to those who are not
selected by lottery but were severely damaged, because it would delay their
compensation.258 A lottery, therefore, would be a detriment to the least
advantaged plaintiffs. It would be better either to pick the most harmed cases
first or to sample from each tier and litigate the sample cases simultaneously.
There are serious difficulties with the most-harmed-first approach,
however. First, it is difficult to determine which plaintiff is the most harmed.
Is it the one entitled to the highest award in monetary terms under the
substantive law or the one who perhaps is entitled to a lesser award but enters
the legal system with the greatest need for his award? This question returns
us to the problem of social luck, which goes largely unaddressed by the tort
system. There is an opportunity for judges to take such considerations into
account in case management because they are discretionary, for the most
part. But if we set aside this problem for a moment, there is no justification
for treating those with less severe harms more favorably than those with
more severe harms. Doing so increases the inequality already suffered by the
severely harmed. Accordingly, a court is justified in choosing the most
severe cases to be heard first, with the court's challenge being how to define
the meaning of "most harmed."
A second challenge to the most-harmed-first approach is that it appears
to conflict with the principle of randomization. If the most harmed are
disproportionately selected for trial, then the sample is by definition not
random. The reason there is no conflict, however, is that severity of harm
ought to be one of the parameters of the appropriate reference class. A
258. The most harmed plaintiffs who were in fact selected to go first would benefit under such




rigorous sampling process would not average the results of sample trials of
substantially harmed individuals with those of individuals who were only
minimally harmed. Instead, the population of similarly harmed individuals
would constitute a reference class, and the sample would be randomly chosen
from that group. To use the earlier example of hand injuries, the court would
survey the litigants to determine which ones were concert pianists and sam-
ple from that group first. The results of that sample would be extrapolated to
all the concert pianists. Then the court would randomly sample from the
population with lesser harms-the white-collar workers-and the results
from those trials would be extrapolated to the other white-collar workers.
The most-harmed-first approach was adopted by Judge Hellerstein in
the WTC Disaster Site Litigation. Instead of hearing cases on a first come,
first served basis, he singled out the most harmed plaintiffs and sampled from
that group.2 59 This required substantial data collection, which is necessary in
any event in order to determine the appropriate reference classes for
sampling. In the WTC Disaster Site Litigation, this data came largely from
plaintiffs themselves (and their attorneys). 2 60  Self-reporting creates some
possibility for sloppy, mistaken, or even fraudulent reporting, and the court
must design incentives to prevent this behavior as well as systems for moni-
toring lawyers. The design of such systems is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is important to recognize that successful policing of misrepre-
sentation is an important part of fair statistical-adjudication procedures. 2 6 1
3. Transparency.-A statistical-adjudication procedure will lead to
greater transparency of outcomes to the public and litigants for several
reasons. First, to the extent that sampling leads to trials, the process and the
results of those trials will be publicly available. Second, court rulings with
respect to docket management and sampling procedures will be published or
available at the courthouse. Already most decisions in high-profile multidis-
trict litigation may be accessed free of charge on court websites, although
transcripts of hearings and expert reports are ordinarily not available online.
Third, because judges, special masters, or experts must articulate the
reasons for pursuing a particular sampling regime, choosing reference
classes, and determining relevant variables, the reasoning behind these
decisions will be available to litigants (at a minimum) and ought to be avail-
able to the public as well. As mentioned earlier, the Vioxx settlement claims
administrator created an online calculator that shows how a plaintiff with the
relevant characteristics will be compensated under the settlement regime.262
259. Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, supra note 19, at 2-3.
260. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlements, U. MEM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-20), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1783792 (comparing
three mass tort case studies and analyzing the effect that a high volume of claims has on a court's
and a defendant's ability to identify and dispose of specious claims).
262. See supra note 120.
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The settlement in the WTC Disaster Site Litigation is also publicly available,
although there is no calculator for damages as of yet, and the judge initially
expressed concern that the valuation process for individuals was not suffi-
ciently transparent for litigants to make informed decisions about whether
joining the settlement would be beneficial for them.263 In that case, the judge
even held a fairness hearing, although there is no legal mandate to hold one
in aggregate litigation.264
Because judges must justify sampling regimes, sampling brings to the
forefront and makes transparent usually unarticulated assumptions about
what does and what ought to matter in evaluating compensation in tort cases.
Although lawyers and judges may have an informal sense of these
assumptions, they are rarely, if ever, publicized, and the informal senses may
well be wrong, even though the participants are experts.265 Sampling there-
fore leads to greater rigor in methodology, creates accountability through
publicity, and encourages the type of openness and dialogue that ought to be
the hallmark of a civil justice system in a democracy. It enforces the type of
reason giving for differential treatment that is required by the right to
outcome equality.
C. The Challenges of Sampling
Achieving outcome equality through sampling and similar Trial by
Formula procedures is not easy. This subpart considers the flaws in sampling
processes utilized by district court judges to achieve outcome equality.
Sampling in litigation is challenging for four reasons: (1) the opt-out
problem, (2) risk of sample bias, (3) uncertainty, and (4) cost. First, if plain-
tiffs believe that an averaging regime will systematically lower the highest
value awards, most will opt out, making any sampling regime impossible to
implement. Second, the design of any statistical experiment requires an
unbiased sample, a requirement that has not been met by the informational
sampling procedures courts currently use. Third, variation in the results of
adjudication is sometimes difficult to explain and creates impediments to the
construction of a fair extrapolation process. Finally, a rigorous sampling
263. See Mireya Navarro, Federal Judge Orders More Talks on 9/11 Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/nyregion/20zero.html ("Judge
Hellerstein also said that the terms of the settlement were too complicated for the plaintiffs to be
able to reach an 'intelligent decision' on whether to accept it.").
264. Mireya Navarro, U.S. District Court Approves Ground Zero Health Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/nyregion/24zero.html; see
also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (coining the
term "quasi-class action" to describe the application of class action protections to aggregate
litigation).
265. See William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-
Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293, 298-99 (1996) (demonstrating that
expert opinions are not better (and are often worse) than very crude statistical predictions). Thanks
to Peter Siegelman for this point.
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regime is also likely to be more costly than the informal, lawyer-driven
sampling regime currently in use. This subpart will discuss each of these
problems in turn and demonstrate that they do not pose serious impediments
to the success of a sampling regime and to the realization of litigants' rights
to outcome equality.
1. The Opt-Out Problem.-Where there is substantial variation among
plaintiffs, an averaging regime will redistribute damages from plaintiffs with
the cases assigned the highest value (the $100 plaintiffs in our prior example)
to those assigned the lowest value (the $50 plaintiffs). Under averaging,
plaintiffs who might have received $100 will now receive only $75, and
plaintiffs who might have received $50 will now receive an extra $25. If a
system such as this grants plaintiffs the autonomy to exit, one would predict
that the pool would suffer from adverse selection.266 The plaintiffs with the
greatest anticipated awards will opt out of the procedure and leave only the
plaintiffs with the lowest value claims to participate. This is because those
with greater anticipated awards will predict that they will be systematically
undercompensated in the averaging process. Each plaintiff can anticipate
that other plaintiffs with higher awards will not participate, causing the aver-
age compensation to be reduced until finally only plaintiffs with claims not
otherwise worth litigating will be left in the procedure. Enabling plaintiffs to
opt out of a sampling procedure will result in its unraveling.
David Rosenberg has proposed mandatory class actions as a solution to
the unraveling problem. 26 7 This solution is sound in theory, but in practice it
is unlikely to succeed-at least as a court-driven procedural innovation-
because it runs against the tide of the Supreme Court's individualist
261jurisprudence, which has consistently limited mandatory class actions.
Legislative change would be required to implement it.
An insight from the economic analysis of law, confirmed by the practice
of aggregate settlement on the ground, indicates that sampling procedures
may successfully retain plaintiffs even where no mandatory class can be
certified. Adverse selection in the litigation context depends on the plaintiffs
knowing more about their claims than the court knows. 26 9 Where plaintiffs
266. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492-94 (1970) (describing the concept of adverse selection in the
context of the insurance market, where "as the price level rises the people who insure themselves
[are] those who are increasingly certain that they will need the insurance[,] . .. with the result that
no insurance sales may take place at any price"). For a comprehensive and critical discussion of the
concept, see generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
267. Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action, supra note 22, at 833.
268. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557-61 (2011) (decertifying a
mandatory injunctive class action); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999)
(decertifying a mandatory limited fund class action).
269. Cf Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
18-23 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 651, 2009),
[Vol. 90:571622
The Case for "Trial by Formula"
are not able to outguess the court or jury with respect to their award, they
will not be able to engage in adverse selection. The current popularity of
informal sampling procedures to spur settlement despite inconsistent verdicts
is good evidence that plaintiffs (and their lawyers) do not know more about
the probable outcome of their cases than the court does. For example, the
verdicts in the Vioxx cases that were tried to juries varied substantially.
Some cases resulted in $50 million verdicts, others in no liability.270 Even
cases decided in the same forum under the same legal regime were split. Of
the five cases tried in New Jersey state court, two were defense verdicts and
three resulted in multimillion-dollar verdicts for plaintiffs. 27' There was
some reasonable means of distinguishing these cases, as evidenced by the
fact that in the settlement the lawyers were able to come up with a schedule
for assigning damages.272 Nevertheless, it does not seem that either side was
able to predict outcomes. Even if lawyers were equipped to predict jury ver-
dicts reliably, judges retain the power to reduce awards through motions for
judgment as a matter of law, remittitur, and judgment on appeal.
A mass exodus of plaintiffs from a sampling procedure indicates that
the plaintiffs can predict that they are likely to obtain a greater award by pur-
suing a lawsuit on their own than the extrapolation process would award
them. To the extent that this prediction is based on ascertainable variables,
these variables should be included in the model, obviating the need for plain-
tiffs to opt out. If their prediction is based on over-optimism or risk-seeking
behavior, there is little to be done other than educating plaintiffs.
In a sampling procedure, the plaintiff gives up the chance to receive an
outlier award in exchange for the guarantee of an average payment that is
paid out more quickly than waiting in line. That this exchange is beneficial
for plaintiffs is demonstrated by plaintiffs' near universal acceptance of the
Vioxx and WTC Disaster Site Litigation settlements.273 If the variability of
the distribution in the group of plaintiffs is not too great, sampling will
equalize awards among similarly situated persons and prevent some individ-
uals from receiving lower awards than they should for extralegal or
unjustifiable reasons. For these reasons, both risk-neutral and risk-averse
plaintiffs ought to prefer a sampling regime to individual litigation even
though that regime averages verdicts.
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1513354 (describing cases where individuals are not able to
outguess insurance companies so that they cannot engage in optimizing behavior that characterizes
adverse selection).
270. See Lahav, Recovering Social Value, supra note 118, at 2394 & nn.106-07 (collecting
Vioxx verdicts); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Vioxx Verdicts, MASS TORT LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 29,
2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mass-tort litigation/2009/1 0/vioxx-verdicts-.html (same).
271. Lahav, Recovering Social Value, supra note 118, at 2394 & nn.106-07.
272. See Vioxx Settlement Calculator, supra note 120 (providing a series of factors used to
approximate each claimant's share of the settlement).
273. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text (describing the WTC Disaster Site




2. Sample Bias.-The most important issue in sampling-whether done
on an anecdotal basis by an individual lawyer negotiating a settlement on
behalf of a client or engineered by a court in the context of aggregate
litigation-is whether the sample is skewed. One must always suspect that
any nonrandom method of picking sample cases will be skewed and therefore
will be an inaccurate estimate of the population average. Second, even if the
sample is an accurate estimate, verdicts may vary for reasons that cannot be
explained. In such a case, the question becomes, what is the significance of
the variations? Are they pure noise, or is there some variable present for
which we need to account?
Sample bias is a substantial problem in the current system. Consider for
a moment how the ordinary lawyer is likely to obtain data for determining
the "going rate" of settlement. The lawyer may be familiar with values in a
set of comparable cases that went to trial because the verdict is publicly
available, or that the lawyer settled or had access to prior settlement data
through informal channels. Thus, the lawyer will either be able to use public
records or friends and colleagues to obtain a dataset.
Trial verdicts are particularly likely to provide unreliable samples for
comparison. There are two reasons for this. First, cases that go to trial are
274
aberrations. A case is likely to reach trial when the parties are very far
apart in evaluating the case. 275 As a corollary, any case where the result is
predictable by both sides is very unlikely to reach trial. After all, if the
parties feel comfortable in their ability to predict the outcome, they are much
better off settling and avoiding the transaction costs of an expensive trial.
Second, parties decide whether to go to trial. Repeat players can therefore
systematically skew the sample of publicly available verdicts in order to
shape an end result that is most favorable for them. Defendants have an eas-
ier time doing this because they can offer settlements to plaintiffs they
believe have strong cases and let weaker cases go to trial. 7
As an example of the selection bias in trials, consider the case of In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.2 7 7 In that case, a group of hemophiliacs who were
infected with AIDS through use of tainted blood products brought a class
274. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 925-26 (2000) (highlighting the increasing rarity of trials).
275. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 370-71 (1986) (noting that
narrowing the divergence between parties' perceived probabilities of the outcome at trial will make
settlement more likely). Much has been written on the theory of settlement in the field of law and
economics. For a somewhat dated but very useful review of the literature, see generally Robert D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
276. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 95, 101-02 (1974) (discussing, among other advantages,
repeat players' ability to settle cases where they expect unfavorable rule outcomes and adjudicate
those that they regard as likely to produce favorable rules).
277. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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278action against the manufacturers of those products. In an opinion written
by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that the case could not
proceed as a class action, reasoning (among other things) that the class action
would exert such extreme pressure on the defendant that it would be forced
to settle.279 In support of the claim that such pressure was unwarranted,
Judge Posner relied on the fact that twelve of the thirteen cases that had gone
to trial resulted in defense verdicts. 2 80 The opinion did not note how it came
to be that these particular thirteen cases went to trial. It is possible, for
example, that the defendant settled all or most trial-ready cases prior to trial
and only permitted those cases it was likely to win to go forward. If that
were the case, any conclusions drawn from this sample of thirteen blood-
products cases would have been biased in favor of the defendant.
For those watching the litigation from afar, it is quite difficult to tell
why some cases reached trial and others settled, leaving ample possibility for
sample bias. This means that conclusions based on trial outcomes without
more information are likely to lead to indefensible results. By indefensible, I
mean results that are not justifiable by reference to outcomes in similar cases
that never reached trial because of the machinations of one side or the other.
Random selection is critical to obtaining a useful sample. Convenience
samples based on the lawyer's personal experience or the experiences of
colleagues suffer from potential bias because they are not randomly selected.
If the lawyer can conduct rigorous qualitative research, namely by collecting
a broader set of cases on which to base his or her evaluation and using them
to develop a fine-grained theory of which variables in that sample are rele-
vant to case outcomes, there is a greater chance that this evaluation will
accurately reflect the going rate of settlement. Even so, qualitative method-
ology requires recognition of its own limitations, such as the potential of
sample bias and the difficulty of finding correct points of comparison. It is
most beneficially used in conjunction with quantitative methods that can
verify findings. Similarly, even when qualitative methods are rigorous, some
type of quantitative analysis is still useful.
In any event, there is no evidence that lawyers use any type of rigorous
qualitative study in determining settlement amounts. If such rigorous meth-
ods are used anywhere, it is likely in the insurance context, where companies
collect data on settlements or perhaps where well-funded lawyers are repeat
players. And even in the case of lawyers who are repeat players, it seems
likely they would be satisfied with convenience sampling given that there is
no incentive to use more rigorous methods. 281
278. Id. at 1294.
279. Id. at 1299.
280. Id. at 1299-300.
281. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) (explaining that the concept of the "availability heuristic" causes
people to rely on accessible, illustrative examples rather than genuine consideration of actual
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3. Uncertainty.-The second most important issue in sampling is
unexplained variability of the distribution of results. One of the key
differences between the type of anecdotal methodology based on conve-
nience sampling that lawyers use in the ordinary course of litigation and a
court-engineered sampling methodology is the potential for the latter method
to give an explicit account of variability. In situations where case outcomes
are very heterogeneous, assigning case values is possible if we believe that
the reasons for variation are "noise" rather than the effect of legally relevant
variables that ought to have been taken into account. This assignment needs
to be justified, however, and an extrapolation process requires that judges do
SO.
One solution to the variability problem is to set the parameters of the
reference class more rigorously.28 2 If the court is sampling from a reference
class of cases that are similar to one another with respect to the key variables,
then the result of sampling should be sufficiently homogeneous to be useful
in valuing other cases in the reference class. That is, we can extrapolate the
results of the sample to the rest of the reference class if all the cases are rea-
sonably similar. But in order to decide the parameters of the appropriate
reference class, the court will need to identify the variables that are relevant
to case outcomes. In other words, determining the parameters of the refer-
ence class requires taking a normative position regarding which variables are
important. Furthermore, these variables must be not only relevant but
objectively verifiable. 28 3 Variables that are not objectively verifiable-such
as a person's mental state-require time-consuming, individualized hearings
in order to be identified in individuals. For this reason, innovative proce-
dures that seek to extrapolate from a sample to a larger population of
plaintiffs are less useful where subjective variables are crucial to determining
outcomes.
Comparing the case at hand to a convenience sample may create the
illusion that we know its value with certainty. In convincing clients to settle,
lawyers are likely to be too sure that the client's case is comparable to other
cases they have in mind, even when those cases evidence a selection bias.
By contrast, a transparent, rigorous sampling method engineered by the court
is less likely to suffer from such failures. Inherent in the task of developing a
sampling methodology for aggregate litigation ought to be a process for tak-
ing a hard look at the problems of sample bias and the significance of
probabilities); cf Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973) (observing that individuals
perceive an event as more probable if a similar event has recently occurred).
282. See Cheng, supra note 173, at 2095-97 (contending that, in legal contexts, using model-
selection criteria to define the reference class will help to alleviate traditional reference-class
problems).
283. See Lahav, Bellwether Trials, supra note 118, at 606 (noting that parties will attempt to
manipulate the variables used to define a reference class unless there exists some "objective means"
to define parameters that bound the group).
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unexplained variability of distribution. A rigorous methodology must recog-
nize that the model will not be perfectly determinative. The question for the
participants in the statistical-adjudication procedure (and the court system
more generally) is how much variance is too much? When does variance
become normatively unappealing? My argument here is that unexplained
variation due to noise is not normatively acceptable because it is inconsistent
with the right to outcome equality.
To the extent that decision makers utilize good sampling methodology,
aggregate litigation may in fact provide better individualized justice than
"individualized" settlements based on convenience sampling. Both in the
individual case and the aggregate case, plaintiffs receive settlements based on
comparable cases. The more rigorous the methodology used to determine
which cases are comparable, the closer the outcome of any individual case to
the average damages assigned in a series of trials of similar cases. This aver-
age is the most defensible method of assigning a damages award.
Since our system monetizes injury in tort cases by comparison to
outcomes in similar cases, especially in settlement, the key to a reliable
valuation will be the quality of the sample used. At its best, a systematic,
rigorous approach to sampling produces results that can be analyzed to assign
a defensible value to a group of mass tort cases before the court. A rigorous
approach to sampling avoids some of the biases and concomitant inequality
in the assignment of damages that plague the convenience-sampling method.
4. Cost.-Cost has largely been the focus of the traditional debate about
mass torts, which pits the individual right to participation against efficient
resolution of cases. Understanding the positive effect of statistical adjudica-
tion on outcome equality adds a new dimension to this debate.
First, perhaps the right to equal treatment in litigation trumps cost
considerations, even if it is determined that rigorous sampling is intolerably
expensive as compared to the current pro-settlement regime. As examined in
Part II, there is some basis in existing doctrine for recognizing a right to
equal treatment in litigation, including equality of outcomes. A system that
was extremely cost-effective would not be valid if it discriminated against
certain protected classes, for example. A robust equality right, therefore,
might trump cost considerations, just as the right to liberty or to a day in
court has in the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence.
How costly would a rigorous approach to sampling be? As described
more thoroughly in the next section, a rigorous sampling experiment will
require a survey of the plaintiffs to be sampled, calculations to determine the
appropriate sample size, and a number of bellwether trials-likely greater
than the four to fifteen trials that courts have experimented with in their past
attempts at informational sampling. Experts will be needed to determine
what type of statistical experiment is needed in order to assign reasonable
values to plaintiffs' cases. Trying any case is expensive and trying multiple
cases will be even more so, although some economies of scale may be
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achieved. Data collection and analysis will cost something, both in the initial
survey and after the bellwether cases are tried. It is difficult to determine this
cost in the abstract; setting a dollar value on the cost of a procedure requires
a fine-grained knowledge of the type of work to be done in a particular case,
such as the number of relevant variables to be taken into account, the varia-
bility within the plaintiff population, and the level of reliability that will be
deemed acceptable.284 Data collection and analysis will be less costly in
some cases than in others. It makes little sense, therefore, to consider the
question of cost as an empirical, noncomparative matter divorced from a
real-world example.
The question of cost, in the end, is fundamentally comparative. Every
procedure costs something, so the question is, what is the baseline to which
sampling is being compared? 285 Due process doctrine also makes cost a rela-
tive matter. Under the Mathews v. Eldridge2 86 test, the risk of error is to be
balanced against the cost of alternative procedures. 287 Therefore, determin-
ing whether a rigorous sampling procedure meets the requirements of due
process comes down to a comparison. The choice of baseline cost to which
sampling is compared is a normative one. Accordingly, cost is not an inde-
pendent argument against or in favor of sampling, but instead one that rides
on the back of larger beliefs.
For purposes of evaluating expense, should we compare innovative
procedures to the normative baseline of current practice, which largely
consists of settlements, or to the normative baseline of the "day in court"
ideal? Either choice must be justified. Moreover, this choice is part of a
larger debate about the private and public role of the tort system, the privati-
zation of adjudication, and the decline of the civil trial.2 89 Compared to the
baseline of the day-in-court ideal, sampling represents a real cost savings
284. See Kadane, supra note 248 (manuscript at 3-6) (describing cases in which different
sampling methods were used).
285. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987) ("Market
ordering under the common law was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct,
and it formed the baseline from which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that
distinguished action from inaction and neutrality from impermissible partisanship.").
286. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
287. Id. at 335 (noting that a due process analysis requires "consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest").
288. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28, 30 (1976) (criticizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Mathews as focusing too much on
"questions of technique rather than questions of value" and thereby being "unresponsive to the frill
range of concerns embodied in the due process clause").
289. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 626-27 (2005) (arguing in favor of a
constitutional right to some kind of tort system); Resnik, supra note 28, at 549-51 (discussing
privatization of the court system through increased use of arbitration).
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because it means trying fewer cases, and trials are very expensive. Choosing
the day-in-court ideal as the baseline entails a normative view of the
litigation system as a public good. Trials are democracy-promoting events
and sampling is a way to encourage them. 290 On the other hand, choosing the
extant regime of aggregate settlement as a cost baseline makes sampling
seem very expensive. The current approaches to informational sampling
sometimes involve trying no cases at all, and the bellwether trial plans put
forth by judges generally include very few trials.29 1 Compared to these
practices, a rigorous sampling system would require many more trials and,
therefore, would be more expensive. Finally, an analysis of cost must also
consider whether the cost calculus takes into account costs to litigants only or
to the judicial system292 and whether the calculus will take into account some
of the benefits of litigation, including information forcing.
Accordingly, even if the equality right is defined as a weaker right, it
ought to be included in the due process calculus. Among the interests that
ought to be included in the Mathews calculus, if it is applied in this context,
is the government or court's interest in the equal treatment of persons before
the law and in giving reasoned justifications for differential treatment of
similarly situated persons.
D. Requirements of a Rigorous Sampling Methodology
What are the requirements of a rigorous sampling technique? A reliable
sample requires that the selection process be free from bias and that the sam-
ple be sufficiently large to produce reliable results given the variance of
outcomes within the group.
Making sure that the sample is not biased is best achieved by collecting
a random sample. Randomization has not generally been the practice in
court-engineered sampling, but it should be. Courts seem to prefer a sample
constructed by permitting defendants' and plaintiffs' attorneys to each
choose an equal number of cases, with perhaps a few additional cases thrown
in by the court.29 3 This method gives the parties the illusion of control. It
has the merit of signaling the nature of the bias inherent in the sample. We
can predict that the defendants' attorneys will try to pick their best cases-
that is, cases that will minimize recovery-whereas the plaintiffs' attorneys
are likely to pick the cases that maximize recovery. This knowledge can help
290. See Lahav, Bellwether Trials, supra note 118, at 594 (noting that bellwether trials promote
democratic decision making).
291. For example, in the WTC Disaster Site Litigation only six trials (out of the first group of
2,000 cases) were originally planned. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing the
trial plan).
292. See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (discussing the failure of
parties on both sides to take into account the social costs of litigation).
293. See Fallon et al., supra note 207, at 2349 (explaining that selection by attorneys is the best
option when the pool for bellwether cases is being filled).
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us determine how much we ought to discount the verdicts in the cases
selected by the parties. Nevertheless, litigant-driven sampling encourages
the selection of outlier cases and is not likely to produce a dataset that pro-
vides reliable information about the distribution of the larger set of cases.
If that distribution is already known and it is possible to situate the biased
sample cases within that distribution, the limits of this method may be
surmountable. But that is impossible without some preliminary procedure,
such as a survey using random sampling, to determine the characteristics of
the larger population. In any event, if a larger study has been done, there is
no need to follow it with biased sampling that cannot reveal information the
court and litigants need to settle cases fairly.
A second requirement is that the sample be sufficiently large to provide
reliable results. The size of the population of cases being measured does not
dictate the size of the sample. Instead, the size of the sample will depend on
the variability of the group.29 5 In the mass tort context, the special master
ought to determine what observable and relevant criteria exist that can place
individuals within acceptably homogenous subgroups and then sample from
each of those subgroups. The samples need not be large. The more
homogeneous the group, the smaller the necessary sample. Because tort
cases present numerous potentially relevant variables, and because cases can
differ from one another considerably (in relevant and irrelevant ways), courts
need a good estimate of the variations within the group in order to determine
what the size of the sample ought to be.
A preliminary estimate of the subgroupings within a mass tort may be
obtained through the collection of data from the parties. For example, in the
WTC Disaster Site Litigation, Judge Hellerstein ordered the parties to com-
plete questionnaires to determine the variability within the group.296 The
judge determined the size of the sample to be tried prior to the litigants actu-
297
ally completing the questionnaires. It seems he did this largely because the
timing of completing the questionnaires would have held off sample trials for
too long, delaying justice for individuals and leaving defendants in limbo.
But this approach can result in too rough an estimate of damages.
In a rigorous sampling method, in contradistinction to the current
informal practice, the variability in the population will determine the size of
the sample. It is not possible to determine the appropriate sample size
without first obtaining a sense of that variability. If the group is relatively
homogeneous, then a small sample will be enough. But if there is substantial
294. Id.
295. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 371 (3d ed. 1998) ("[T]he likely size of the
chance error in sample percentages depends mainly on the absolute size of the sample, and hardly at
all on the size of the population").
296. See Order Amending Case Management Order No. 8, supra note 19, at 1-2 (ordering
parties to gather and turn in plaintiffs' responses to questionnaires).
297. Id. at 2.
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variation within the group, the sample size will need to be larger. To know
the margins of variation, courts need to obtain information about the popula-
tion to be sampled through surveys such as that used in the WTC Disaster
Site Litigation or past experience.
So why do courts try a sample that is likely too small? First, the court
might move a few cases toward trial on the theory that the momentum will
result in settlements. The object of the procedure in that case is not to con-
struct the most reliable procedure to assign damages but to construct a
procedure that will promote settlement. The momentum approach seems to
have been adopted in the September 11th Litigation. In that case, the judge
slated cases for trial explicitly in order to encourage settlement, on the theory
that even a single verdict would bring the settlement offers on both sides
closer together. 2 98 No case has been tried, but a number were settled as they
approached trial.299
Second, as cases proceed through pretrial litigation-discovery,
summary judgment, and motions in limine-lawyers narrow their claims and
develop a keener sense of the story that they will be able to tell at trial.
These developments might be called the "soft benefits" of sampling. The
questions presented in a given case are framed more precisely, and often,
some of the claims initially included in the complaint fall away.
Furthermore, summary judgment decisions, especially those on questions of
law where individual variables are not likely to matter, dispose of issues that
are similar in the larger population of cases. Even if such decisions are not
preclusive as a formal matter, they serve as an indicator of what is likely to
occur in the other cases presenting similar issues consolidated before the
same judge. When the court decides such dispositive or key issues, lawyers
use them to develop a finer sense of the possibilities in other cases. But the
reliability of these predictions is not the same for all issues facing litigants.
The closer the decided issue is to a question of law applicable across cases,
the more likely it is that the judge's decision will have an impact on other
cases in the reference class.
Permitting a small sample of cases to go forward on a limited basis,
even if the results cannot be reliably extrapolated across cases, can be very
useful in case coordination and issue refinement. Nevertheless, courts must
recognize the limits of an approach that does not use a reliable sample. If the
results of a very limited convenience sample are used to determine outcomes
in a broad range of cases without attention to the variables that differentiate
298. See Opinion Supporting Order to Sever Issues of Damages and Liability in Selected Cases,
and to Schedule Trial of Issues of Damages at 5, In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21MC97 opinion
070507.pdf (explaining that cases were chosen for trials of damages to hasten their resolution as
well as the resolution of other cases).
299. See Order at 1-2, In re Sept. 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/rulings/21MC97_order091707.pdf (ordering
fourteen cases closed due to settlement).
6312012]
Texas Law Review
those cases, the result will not reflect a reasonable assignment of damages
based on comparable cases. Such a process would violate the right to
outcome equality and be unfair to the litigants.
Even if the larger population is meticulously studied and grouped into
more homogenous categories based on observable and relevant criteria, there
will still be some noise. This noise will be caused by variables that are not
observable although legally relevant or that are not legally relevant but nev-
ertheless alter the outcome in a given case. Furthermore, there may be
variables that are observable and relevant but are so rarely present that it is
difficult to take them into account through sampling.
To illustrate, return for a moment to the hypothetical group of
individuals suffering hand injuries. Recall that most of them are white-collar
workers but one is a concert pianist. Everyone involved in the litigation may
agree that the concert pianist should receive greater compensation than a
lawyer for the same hand injury. But she presents a significant problem for
the sampling procedure. It is hard to predict the presence of the concert pia-
nist within the group. If the concert pianist is within the sample, then her
presence will skew the results and the rest of the group will be
overcompensated. But if the fact that she is a concert pianist is not taken into
account for her individual case, then she will be undercompensated. The
court will need to realize that the presence of a pianist is a relevant factor that
should be included in the model. In the alternative, the concert pianist may
choose to opt out of the procedure in advance. But she will only do so if she
can predict the makeup of the rest of the group, that is, if she can identify
herself as an outlier. 30 0 If the costs of determining variables such as the
presence of outliers are very great, this presents a problem for implementing
a sampling procedure in the real world. The success of scheduling of injury
valuation in mass settlements to date indicates that outliers will not pose an
insurmountable barrier.
Rigorous sampling forces litigants and the court to face the issue of
variance in the distribution of damages awards. It requires courts and liti-
gants to think systematically about both the generic case of the white-collar
worker and the outlier case of the concert pianist. Courts must either justify
treating the concert pianist the same as a white-collar worker or create a pro-
cedure to fairly distinguish her case. Such systematic consideration is the
first step to a fair and transparent resolution of large-scale litigation. It is
also a requirement for realizing the right to outcome equality in litigation.
The alternative is not likely to be the vindication of liberty through an accu-
rate determination of each case through individualized litigation. Instead, the
result will be the even rougher justice of convenience sampling.
300. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing how adverse selection will only be
a problem if the litigant knows more than the judge about likely outcomes).
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The trend toward informal sampling as a method for encouraging
settlement brings the traditional method of case valuation--comparison-out
of the shadows. Sampling illustrates, counterintuitively, that justice admin-
istered at the wholesale level may be less rough than that at the individual
level precisely because random sampling is better than convenience
sampling. Statistical techniques like sampling also allow participants in the
civil justice system to quantify risk. In ordinary litigation, there is also a risk
of error and the presence of uncertainty, but it goes unarticulated and too
often is ignored. The result is unexplained variation and inequitable
outcomes. Sampling offers an opportunity to realize the right to outcome
equality in litigation and to justify outcomes both to participants in the tort
system and its critics.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has endeavored to defend the principle of outcome equality
as a counterpoint to the Supreme Court's overemphasis on liberty and indi-
vidualism in litigation. 30 1 The principle of outcome equality is at work in
judicial attempts to use sampling to determine both the order in which cases
proceed and the manner in which they are resolved. Although it seems that
equality in civil litigation is in retreat at the moment, on closer inspection, the
fact that district court judges continue to pursue outcome equality through
informal statistical adjudication indicates a strong possibility for the balance
to shift in its favor.
Other procedural revolutions have initially emerged at the district court
level. For example, district courts were applying a pleading standard requir-
ing more than "notice pleading" before the Supreme Court's recent pleading
cases tightened that standard.302 Although many perceived Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly303 and Ashcroft v. Iqba 3 04 as revolutionary, a close study
of district court opinions revealed that the revolution had been brewing for
some time. 30 5 One can only speculate as to why the district courts have pur-
sued outcome equality when the emphasis at the appellate level has been so
consistently tilted towards liberty. Perhaps the district courts, seeing a larger
set of cases and being closer to outcomes, are better able to appreciate
the negative consequences of inequality wrought by inconsistency in
adjudication.
301. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
302. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987, 988
(2003) (describing how the rhetoric of notice pleading did not match the reality of what the lower
federal courts were doing on motions to dismiss).
303. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
304. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
305. Fairman, supra note 302, at 1011-59 (describing pleading practices in the federal courts
with respect to a number of substantive areas).
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Trial by Formula has the potential to resolve many other problems that
plague modem litigation. For example, commentators have repeatedly
306lamented patterns of baseless claiming in mass tort litigation. Sampling
offers a way of addressing the phenomenon of fraudulent claims and creating
incentives to curb them. 3 0 7 But as this Article has endeavored to show, sam-
pling is more than an innovative and efficient procedure for resolving
litigation and realizing the aims of the substantive law. Rigorous statistical
methods can realize one of the fundamental ideals of the legal system that
has been wrongfully ignored: the right to equal treatment before the law. By
improving their statistical methods, district courts can restore the needed bal-
ance between the right to liberty and the right to equality. Perhaps in time
the balance will shift in the Supreme Court as well.
306. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Use ofLitigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for
Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1228 (2008) (arguing that litigation screenings have led to a large
number of specious, perhaps even fraudulent, claims in asbestos, silica, silicone-breast-implant, fen-
phen, and welding-fume mass tort litigation).
307. In the Diet Drugs Litigation, for example, it was determined that some lawyers were
submitting claims to the settlement administrator using falsified results. See In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 505-07 (E.D.
Pa. 2005). The court's initial solution, ultimately scuttled by the defendant, was to sample claims.
See id. at 507 (noting that the court imposed a 100% auditing rate on claims after concerns of
illegitimate claims arose). For a discussion of this case at greater length, see Lahav, supra note 28,
at 406-16.
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